--- title: "Alternative for Germany: Why the AfD Remains Loyal to Moscow as Europe Turns Away" description: "While other European right-wing parties have changed their rhetoric after 2022, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) remains loyal to Moscow. 🇩🇪🇷🇺 The party's leaders do not condemn Putin, demand the lifting of sanctions, and even threaten Ukraine with compensation for \"Nord Stream.\" This makes the AfD a unique and dangerous phenomenon on the continent. 🚩" date: 2026-07-23T14:27:09.000Z lang: en url: https://xab.info/en/posts/alternative-for-germany-pro-russia-stance-analysis tags: [afd, germany, russia, ukraine, alice-weiidel] publisher: "XAB.info" --- # Alternative for Germany: Why the AfD Remains Loyal to Moscow as Europe Turns Away ![Russian flag with double-headed eagle waving in front of the Reichstag in Berlin, symbolizing the political bond between the Berlin Party and Moscow amid Europe's distancing](https://xab.info/media/2026/07/23/afds-germany-pro-russia-stance-analysis/afds-germany-pro-russia-stance-analysis-1.webp) A persistent belief has taken hold in public consciousness: all right-wing parties in Europe form a unified front of pro-Russian forces. However, reality is more complex. If one examines the political landscape of the continent, it becomes clear that the foreign policy doctrine of many nationalist movements is either ill-defined or contradictory. Yet, there is one force that stands out from this blurred picture — the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Their sympathies toward Russia are so deep that they cannot be dismissed as temporary opportunism. Moreover, the party's confident leadership in national ratings is causing serious concern among Western analysts. ### Ideological Foundation: From Bismarck to Putin The Alternative for Germany is a unique phenomenon within the family of European right-wing parties. Unlike colleagues who have adjusted their rhetoric under pressure of circumstances, the AfD adopted a clear pro-Russian position right from its founding in 2013. Neither the annexation of Crimea, nor the invasion of Donbas in 2014, nor the full-scale aggression of 2022 compelled the party to reconsider its course toward strategic partnership with Moscow. The roots of this position lie in historical myths and revisionism. One of the party's co-founders, Alexander Gauland, early on compared the loss of "holy Kyiv" for Russia to the loss of Cologne for Germany. He insisted that Europe should act with "greater respect for Russian sensitivities" and criticized NATO expansion beyond the Oder River. The party's programmatic document from that time expressed gratitude to Moscow for its "positive role in decisive moments of German history". ### Contrast with European Colleagues Until 2022, pro-Russian rhetoric was indeed popular among right-wing forces on the continent. Marine Le Pen (France), Giorgia Meloni (Italy), Nigel Farage (UK), and Geert Wilders (Netherlands) repeatedly justified the Kremlin's actions or called for understanding "Putin's concerns". They were skeptical of sanctions, arguing they caused economic harm, and recognized Russia's special rights to Crimea. A striking example was Wilders' visit to the State Duma in 2018 as a sign of "Russian-Dutch friendship" or Le Pen's meeting with Putin in 2017. However, after the start of the full-scale war, most of these politicians demonstrated evolution. Right-wing leaders in France, Italy, and other countries, while not becoming fervent pro-Ukrainians, publicly condemned the aggression and attempted to distance themselves from supporting Putin's crimes. They avoid nostalgia for the Kremlin, understanding the political risks. ### Uniqueness and Danger of the AfD The Alternative for Germany did not follow this trend. The party refused even at a formal level to condemn Putin for violating international law. This makes the AfD the only major player on the European stage that has not adjusted its rhetoric after 2022. MPs from the party continue to demand: - Cessation of weapons supplies to Ukraine; - Lifting of sanctions against Russia; - Restoration of Russian energy imports to Germany. Furthermore, while representatives of the "National Rally" or "Brothers of Italy" have ceased visits to Moscow, AfD leaders continue to visit Russia on official trips. ### Anti-Ukrainian Rhetoric at its Peak The party's leaders do not shy away from expressions that other right-wing forces in Europe try to avoid. AfD co-chair Alice Weidel has publicly threatened to demand that Ukraine return financial aid, emphasizing compensation for damage to the "Nord Stream" pipeline. She expresses outrage at the possibility of sending German tanks against Russia and accuses Kyiv of provoking Moscow with drone strikes. Thus, the Alternative for Germany remains the only major political force in Europe that not only preserves old ties but actively develops an anti-Ukrainian agenda, putting the unity of the Western front at risk.