---
title: "Elections During Wartime: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of 1917–1921 — A Column by Yulia Kyryienko-Merina"
description: "Yulia Kyryienko-Merina's column examines the risks of elections in Ukraine during wartime: from the historical parallel with 1917–1921 to problems with displaced persons and digital voting through 'Diia'."
date: 2026-08-20T07:06:03.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/elections-during-wartime-are-we-repeating-the-mistakes-of-1917-1921
tags: [ukraine-elections, war-voting, fedorov, historical-parallel, diia-app, internal-displacement]
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Elections During Wartime: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of 1917–1921 — A Column by Yulia Kyryienko-Merina

![Voting in Ukraine during wartime: people move a numbered ballot box with the trident emblem against a flag and historic mosaic backdrop](https://xab.info/media/2026/08/20/vybory-vo-vremya-voyny-ne-povtoryaem-li-my-oshibok-1917-1921-godov/vybory-vo-vremya-voyny-ne-povtoryaem-li-my-oshibok-1917-1921-godov-1.webp)

## 🎯 Key Points

- Yulia Kyryienko-Merina warns that elections during wartime may repeat the mistake of 1917–1921, when the vote did not lead to a stable sovereign power.
- The author interprets the former defence minister Fedorov's appeal to hold elections as his move into the role of a political leader.
- Practical barriers: around 5 million displaced persons, 6 oblasts with active hostilities, incomplete internet coverage, and not everyone uses smartphones.
- The Office of the President is not against elections but doubts they can be held under rocket attacks; the author shares this doubt.
- Editor's note: Yevhen Humair was officially appointed head of the Ministry of Defence with 312 votes, whereas the column retains the author's wording on Fedorov's status.

The topic of possible elections in Ukraine has once again returned to the public space — and not least thanks to a resonant appeal by the former Ukrainian defence minister. In a fresh column, Yulia Kyryienko-Merina examines why the idea of holding a vote amid an active war looks less like a democratic breakthrough and more like a risk of repeating a historical mistake. The author emphasises: the question is not whether one is 'for' or 'against' elections in the abstract, but whether they can be transparent, valid, and recognised by the international community given six oblasts with active hostilities, a million-strong army, and millions of displaced people.

### Fedorov's Appeal and the Political Landscape

As the author notes, the former defence minister's appeal was expected: he has few chances of returning to the minister's chair, and he is, in effect, 'going all in'. According to Kyryienko-Merina, his status as a political leader was 'proven by cardboard [signs]', and he made his final decision on this path visible in a video. At the same time, the author herself says outright that she is 'getting scared' — and so are those who have studied history. Fedorov's key argument boils down to the claim that it is Russia that dictates to Ukraine when to hold elections. However, as the author points out, the Russian president has already stated that the Ukrainian leader is illegitimate — that is, in effect also hinting at the need for elections. The question arises: who is actually dictating to Ukraine whether to hold a vote?

### Historical Parallel: 1917–1921

The column's central argument is built on a historical precedent. In 1917–1921, Ukrainians stood against the Bolsheviks, and due to the invasion elections could be held only in some districts — Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, Volyn, and Podillia. Power, in the author's words, 'did not become sovereign': it was overthrown by those who occupied Ukraine. This was followed, as Kyryienko-Merina emphasises, by eighty years of Soviet rule — the Holodomor, the destruction of culture, millions dead. 'This has already happened. Do we want it again?' — the author asks rhetorically, reminding that support from European partners is currently at its peak.

### Practical Barriers: Displaced Persons, the Front, and Digitalisation

The author lists specific obstacles to a fair vote: around five million displaced persons, six oblasts with active hostilities, a million-strong army. The question of how to ensure a transparent and valid vote that the world will recognise and after which partners will continue cooperation remains unanswered. The idea of voting through the 'Diia' app does not remove the problems: internet coverage is not everywhere, and part of the population does not use smartphones at all. 'Will their votes not be counted? Then where is the democracy?' — the author asks. In the Office of the President, as Kyryienko-Merina notes, they responded that they are not against elections, but are not sure they will take place under rocket attacks. 'And I am not sure either,' the author adds.

### Contradictory Data

There are discrepancies in the column text and in the accompanying materials that are important to note. First, the column itself retains the author's wording, current at the time of writing, whereas the editor's note clarifies: as of the time of publication, Yevhen Humair officially headed the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine — the Verkhovna Rada appointed him to the post with 312 votes. That is, the public status of 'former minister' and 'dismissed' with regard to Fedorov in news sources (TASS, Inosmi, Jauns.lv) coincides with the fact of appointing a new head of the department, but in the author's text he is described through the prism of his personal political choice. Second, the contradiction is built into Fedorov's own argument: the claim that 'Russia dictates the timing of elections' is disputed by the author, who points to the Russian president's earlier statements about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian leader. Both versions — the initiator's position and the critic's — are presented openly, with no final assessment given.

### Conclusion: The Risk of Repeating the Mistake

The column ends not with a call but with a warning: holding elections under wartime conditions may reproduce the 1917–1921 scenario, when the vote did not lead to a stable sovereign power but became a trigger for further occupation and decades of repression. The author does not deny the very idea of elections, but questions their technical and political feasibility 'here and now' — under rocket attacks, amid mass displacement of the population, and incomplete digital coverage. The final emphasis is on the moment: support from European partners is at its peak, and therefore, in the author's logic, risking it for a premature vote means putting both democratic procedures and international support at risk.

## 🔍 Fact-Check Verification

- [Elections During Wartime: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of 1917-1921](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/vibori-pid-chas-viyni-chi-povtoryuemo-mi-1787209252.html) - Первичный источник колонки Юлии Кириенко-Мериновой; совпадает с текстом основы (историческая параллель, переселенцы, «Дія», позиция ОП).
- ['Cardboard' Candidate. Why Former Ukrainian Defence Minister Fedorov Called for Elections](https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/28024677) - Подтверждает обращение Федорова с призывом к выборам и его статус экс-министра; соответствует формулировкам колонки.
- ['A Challenge to Zelensky'. Former Ukrainian Defence Minister Called for Elections](https://inosmi.ru/20260819/ukraina-279756582.html) - Подтверждает политический характер обращения и контекст конфликта с действующей властью.
- [Dismissed Ukrainian Defence Minister Demanded Elections Even During Wartime](https://rus.jauns.lv/article/novosti/724506-uvolennyi-ministr-oborony-ukrainy-potreboval-provesti-vybory-daze-vo-vremia-voiny) - Подтверждает требование провести выборы в условиях войны; согласуется с аргументацией колонки.

## ❓ FAQ

### Q: Why does the author compare the possible elections now with 1917–1921?
**A:** Because then, due to the Bolshevik invasion, elections were held only in some districts, and power, in the author's words, did not become sovereign and was overthrown by the occupiers, after which decades of repression followed. The author sees a risk of this scenario being repeated.

### Q: What practical obstacles to voting does the column name?
**A:** Around five million displaced persons, six oblasts with active hostilities, a million-strong army, incomplete internet coverage, and the fact that part of the population does not use smartphones, which calls into question voting through 'Diia'.

### Q: What is the position of the Office of the President on elections during wartime?
**A:** According to the author, the Office of the President responded that it is not against elections, but is not sure they will take place under rocket attacks; the author shares this doubt.

### Q: Who currently heads the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine?
**A:** According to the editor's note, as of the time of publication Yevhen Humair officially headed the Ministry of Defence — the Verkhovna Rada appointed him with 312 votes. The column text retains the author's wording, current at the time of writing.

### Q: What is the contradiction in Fedorov's argument about who 'dictates' the elections?
**A:** Fedorov claims that Russia dictates to Ukraine the timing of elections, however the author points out that the Russian president earlier stated the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian leader, in effect also hinting at elections. The author raises the question of who is actually dictating the decision.