---
title: "The 'Invisible Missile': How Electronic Warfare Diverts 'Shaheds' and Decoys Without Physically Destroying Them"
description: "Contra-Drone co-founder Tymofiy Yurkov explained how electronic warfare diverts real and fake drones without physically destroying them, and why the economics of war must remain in Ukraine's favor."
date: 2026-08-28T13:56:01.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/ew-diverts-shaheds-without-physical-destruction
tags: [electronic-warfare, shahed-drones, air-defense, ukraine, contra-drone, drone-defense]
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# The 'Invisible Missile': How Electronic Warfare Diverts 'Shaheds' and Decoys Without Physically Destroying Them

![Shahed kamikaze drone in flight: how electronic warfare diverts the UAV and decoy targets without physical destruction](https://xab.info/media/2026/08/28/reb-otvodit-shahedy-bez-fizicheskogo-unichtozheniya/reb-otvodit-shahedy-bez-fizicheskogo-unichtozheniya-1.webp)

## 🎯 Key Points

- For every hundred real 'Shaheds,' there may be up to 200 fake targets used to distract air defense.
- EW can divert drones from their route without physically destroying them by affecting their navigation.
- The diversion error depends on weather: from 20–40 m under favorable conditions to 500–600 m under the worst.
- Frontline cities are protected by many small complexes, while major cities by more powerful and camouflaged systems.
- The strategy is built so that the economics of enemy strikes against defense assets are unfavorable to them.

Amid mass drone attacks, the question of protecting rear-area and frontline cities increasingly comes down not only to physically intercepting drones, but also to suppressing their navigation. In an RBC-Ukraine article, Contra-Drone co-founder Tymofiy Yurkov explained exactly how electronic warfare (EW) systems affect the ballistics of 'Shaheds,' 'Bandierol' drone-missiles, and cruise-guided aerial bombs (KABs), and why in the modern confrontation it is more important not to shoot down every target, but to deprive it of the ability to hit its programmed object precisely. In his words, EW can be compared to an 'invisible missile' within an air defense complex: it affects the target without physically destroying it.

### Decoys and the 'Invisible Missile' of EW

The key problem of mass attacks, according to Yurkov, is the large number of false targets. In his words, for every hundred real 'Shaheds' there may be up to 200 fake drones, used to distract Ukrainian air defense and expend expensive interceptors. At the same time, as the expert notes, such targets do not necessarily have to be destroyed: if they are equipped with a cheaper and less protected navigation system, they can simply be diverted from their programmed route using electronic countermeasures. 'They need to be identified, but not necessarily shot down. They can simply be diverted by the effective operation of EW systems,' Yurkov explained. Thus, even if conventional air defense cannot intercept all drones, EW can prevent them from reaching their target precisely.

### Diversion Error and Dependence on Weather

The effectiveness of diversion depends directly on meteorological conditions. According to Yurkov, under the worst conditions the guidance error can be 200–300 meters, and in some cases reach 500–600 meters. Under favorable conditions, this figure drops to roughly 20–40 meters. This means that EW does not guarantee a 'zero' miss, but it significantly reduces the probability of hitting a critical object, turning a precision strike into a miss of hundreds of meters. That is precisely why, in the expert's view, navigation suppression has become a standalone and economically justified element of defense, rather than merely a supplement to physical interception.

### Different Protection for Frontline and Major Cities

Yurkov emphasizes that the approach to protecting frontline cities and the major centers of central, southern, and western Ukraine must be fundamentally different. For the frontline belt, he proposes deploying a large number of small complexes, personal detectors, and electronic countermeasure systems for each unit of automotive and other military equipment, as well as separate long-range detection and suppression systems, so that drones lose the ability to carry out their mission still on the enemy side. 'These should be small complexes, but there must be a large number of them,' he noted. For major cities, by contrast, more powerful infrastructure that is well camouflaged from reconnaissance is acceptable, and, in his opinion, it is not sensible to equip every resident with a personal video-signal detector or to install a vehicle-mounted electronic countermeasure system on every car, since not all drone types can reach the central and western regions.

### The Economics of War as a Defense Factor

The expert places separate emphasis on the economic logic of defense. Using many inexpensive, shorter-range radars complicates the enemy's choice of weapons for destroying them: employing a ballistic missile or a KAB against a cheap radar is economically unjustified. 'We need the economics of war to remain in our favor. Even if the enemy uses million-dollar missiles against EW systems that cost tens of thousands, or against a radar that costs one, two, or three hundred [thousand], the economics remain in our favor,' Yurkov says. Thus, the strategy is built on the principle that every enemy strike against defense assets costs them more than the potential effect of that strike.

## 🔍 Fact-Check Verification

- [How to protect rear-area and frontline cities from 'Shaheds' using EW: an expert's explanation](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/k-zahistiti-tilovi-ta-prifrontovi-mista-vid-1787925139.html) - Первичный источник: интервью с Тимофеем Юрковым (Contra-Drone). Подтверждает пропорцию фейковых целей, механизм отведения РЭБ, погрешность по погоде и разную стратегию защиты городов.
- [EW is not put on a conveyor: on the engineering complexity of the war in the frequency domain](https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/columns/2026/04/16/8030420/) - Контекстный источник: подчёркивает инженерную сложность и неконвейерность производства средств РЭБ, согласуется с тезисом о развёртывании множества малых комплексов.
- [It has become harder for 'Shaheds' to break through to Kyiv: an expert explains how to scale this experience](https://www.unian.net/weapons/kiev-pvo-shahedam-stalo-slozhnee-prorvatsya-v-stolicu-novosti-kieva-13335966.html) - Контекстный источник: подтверждает усиление защиты Киева и масштабирование опыта противодействия «Шахедам».
- [Tymofiy Yurkov](https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/authors/68d6c49902e7a/) - Контекстный источник: подчёркивает инженерную сложность и неконвейерность производства средств РЭБ, согласуется с тезисом о развёртывании множества малых комплексов.

## ❓ FAQ

### Q: What is the 'invisible missile' in the context of EW?
**A:** It is a metaphor used by Tymofiy Yurkov: EW systems affect a drone by suppressing its navigation and diverting it from the target without physically destroying it, much like a missile that strikes its target unnoticed.

### Q: How many fake targets can be in an attack?
**A:** According to Yurkov's estimate, for every hundred real 'Shaheds' there may be up to 200 fake drones used to distract air defense.

### Q: How precisely does EW divert drones?
**A:** The error depends on weather: about 20–40 meters under favorable conditions, 200–300 meters under the worst, and in some cases 500–600 meters.

### Q: How does the protection of frontline and major cities differ?
**A:** For frontline cities, many small complexes and personal electronic countermeasure systems are proposed, while for major cities — more powerful systems camouflaged from reconnaissance; a personal detector for every resident of Kyiv is not required.