---
title: "Contra-Drone Expert: Electronic Warfare Over Kyiv Fails Against Ballistic Missiles, but Jams Shaheds and Some Cruise Missiles"
description: "Contra-Drone co-founder Tymofiy Yurkov explained on the RBC-Ukraine podcast that EW over Kyiv cannot jam high-altitude-correcting ballistic missiles, but effectively suppresses communication for most cruise missiles and mesh-network Shaheds."
date: 2026-11-12T09:00:17.049Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/ew-over-kyiv-fails-ballistic-missiles-contra-drone
tags: [ukraine-war, electronic-warfare, ballistic-missiles, shahed-drones, kyiv-defense, contra-drone, rbc-ukraine]
author: "Alexander Buran"
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Contra-Drone Expert: Electronic Warfare Over Kyiv Fails Against Ballistic Missiles, but Jams Shaheds and Some Cruise Missiles

![Self-propelled launcher with two missiles at a training ground on a sunny day](https://xab.info/media/2026/11/12/reb-nad-kievom-ne-beret-balistiku-ekspert-kontra-drone/reb-nad-kievom-ne-beret-balistiku-ekspert-kontra-drone-1.webp)

## Key Points

- Ballistic missiles correct their trajectory at high altitude over Kyiv and cannot be jammed by EW systems
- EW effectively suppresses the optical guidance of most cruise missiles, depriving them of target 'vision'
- Shahed control mesh networks in Kyiv are almost always completely jammed, but the threat remains outside the city
- New autonomous UAVs with onboard AI and no direct center connection pose a growing challenge for EW

Tymofiy Yurkov, co-founder of the Ukrainian company Contra-Drone, discussed in detail on the RBC-Ukraine podcast "TSE BAZA" which types of air threats are susceptible to electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures and which are not. According to his assessment, ballistic missiles are not among the "jammed" targets: they correct their trajectory at high altitude over Kyiv, and existing EW systems are physically unable to reach that range. "Ballistics are not subject to such jamming. They correct themselves high above the territory of Kyiv, and EW systems have not yet managed to reach that far," Yurkov explained. Thus, he noted, defense solely through EW measures does not work against ballistic threats.

### Cruise Missiles: Optical Guidance as a Vulnerability

Unlike ballistics, most cruise missiles, according to Yurkov's assessment, remain within the operating zone of EW systems. The key defense mechanism here is tied to optical guidance: to prevent a missile from "acquiring" its target via a video camera, it is sufficient to deprive it of the ability to see an area of about one square kilometer. If the guidance error exceeds two kilometers, the missile is highly likely to miss its target, even if the enemy uses new modifications where final guidance is carried out solely using onboard video camera parameters. This, according to the expert, makes EW an effective tool against a significant portion of the cruise missile arsenal.

### Shaheds and Mesh Networks: What Is Actually Jammed in Kyiv

Yurkov focused separately on Shahed-type drones. If a UAV is controlled by an operator or onboard computer via a so-called mesh system (a distributed network), communication with it can be disrupted by EW means. The expert noted that mesh networks in Kyiv are "almost in all cases completely jammed." The threat, he said, persists outside the city—for targets like trains or convoys, where the density of EW and detection assets is significantly lower. At the same time, Yurkov pointed to a technological shift: the latest Chinese developments, including those used by the enemy, have no direct connection to a central control hub—onboard artificial intelligence calculates the trajectory and makes decisions autonomously. According to his data, such logic is used significantly less frequently in Shaheds and primarily for striking moving or small-sized targets.

### Context: New Geran-5 Modification and Growing EW Demands

The discussion on the limits of EW capabilities comes amid reports of the enemy deploying new drone modifications. Earlier, presidential advisor on defense technologies Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that Russia used a new modification of the Geran-5 designated as "Geran-5 K5-K", which received an optical navigation system along with increased range, speed, and flight altitude. It is precisely these characteristics, in Yurkov's view, that make optical guidance the key vulnerable link targeted by EW systems: by depriving the missile of "vision" in the final stretch, even increased guidance accuracy can be neutralized.

### What This Means for City Defense

Yurkov's combined assessments paint the following picture: EW remains a working tool against cruise missiles and, in urban environments, against most Shaheds controlled via mesh networks. However, ballistic missiles that correct at high altitude and autonomous UAVs with onboard AI without external communication are beyond the reach of existing jamming assets. This essentially sets the development vector for air defense and EW systems: either increase the altitude suppression range or strengthen autonomous detection and interception on the final trajectory segment.

## Fact-Check & Sources

- [РЭБ над Киевом не берет баллистику: эксперт рассказал, какие ракеты можно заглушить](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/reb-kievom-bere-balistiku-ekspert-rozpoviv-1794472523.html) - Primary source — the RBC-Ukraine podcast 'TSE BAZA' with Contra-Drone co-founder Tymofiy Yurkov. All quotes and assessments in the article are taken from this material. The mention of 'Geran-5 K5-K' comes from a previously published statement by Beskrestnov cited in the same text.

## FAQ

### Why doesn't EW work against ballistic missiles?

According to Tymofiy Yurkov, ballistic missiles correct their trajectory at high altitude over Kyiv, and existing EW systems are physically unable to reach that range.

### How does EW affect cruise missiles?

EW deprives the missile of the ability to see the target via an optical camera over an area of about one square kilometer. If the guidance error exceeds two kilometers, the missile will likely miss the target.

### Are Shaheds jammed in Kyiv?

Yes, according to Yurkov's assessment, Shahed control mesh networks in Kyiv are almost always completely jammed. The threat persists outside the city where EW density is lower.

### What is the 'Geran-5 K5-K'?

According to defense tech advisor Serhiy Beskrestnov, it is a new modification of the Geran-5 featuring an optical navigation system, increased range, speed, and flight altitude.