---
title: "From 4 to 20 channels: how Ukraine is retooling its EW against fiber-optic drones and new Shaheds"
description: "In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, Contra-Drone co-founder Tymofiy Yurkov explained how the growth in the number of channels in CRPA antennas up to 20, fiber-optic drones, and AI terminal guidance are changing Ukrainian EW tactics and requiring a reconfiguration of the defense of energy facilities."
date: 2026-08-28T07:02:09.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/ew-tactics-shift-amid-new-threats-fiber-optic-drones
tags: [ukraine-war, electronic-warfare, drones, contra-drone, fiber-optic-drones, shahed, gnss, crpa-antenna, ai-guidance]
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# From 4 to 20 channels: how Ukraine is retooling its EW against fiber-optic drones and new Shaheds

![Ukrainian electronic warfare operator in front of portable antenna systems, drone, and mobile EW complexes](https://xab.info/media/2026/08/28/reb-taktika-izmenyaetsya-na-fon-novyh-ugroz-optovolokonnye-drony/reb-taktika-izmenyaetsya-na-fon-novyh-ugroz-optovolokonnye-drony-1.webp)

## 🎯 Key Points

- Russia has moved to 20-channel CRPA GNSS antennas in Shaheds, purchased from China, which requires creating multi-module jamming perimeters around energy facilities
- Fiber-optic UAVs are immune to traditional EW but have drawbacks: greater weight, lower speed, and the risk of the cable being severed
- Contra-Drone is developing an optical detection complex, presented at DNV-1 and currently undergoing testing; it will be used in conjunction with vehicle-mounted EW, not instead of it
- AI terminal guidance of FPV drones is not yet widespread, but experts are tracking its development and forecasting a growing threat

Electronic warfare (EW) remains one of the key elements in defending Ukrainian military forces and civilian infrastructure from Russian drones and missiles. However, according to Tymofiy Yurkov, co-founder of the company Contra-Drone, who in an interview with RBC-Ukraine gave a detailed breakdown of the current challenges, the adversary is systematically changing its tactics: increasing the number of channels in the navigation antennas of UAVs, switching to fiber-optic control channels, developing automatic terminal guidance using artificial intelligence, and employing jet-powered modifications of the Shahed. All of these factors directly affect the effectiveness of existing EW systems and require a reassessment of the defense architecture, particularly around the perimeter of critical infrastructure.

### The evolution of CRPA antennas: from simple GPS to 20-channel systems

One of the most significant trends, as highlighted by Yurkov, is the gradual increase in complexity of the navigation modules in large drones, primarily in the Shahed. At the start of the full-scale war, such UAVs used ordinary GPS antennas, which could be jammed with standard electronic noise at the corresponding frequency. Then CRPA antennas (Constantly Reconfigurable Phase Array) appeared — first four-module, then 8-channel, 12-channel, and 16-channel systems. According to Contra-Drone, at present the Russians have purchased large batches of 20-channel GNSS navigation systems from China. In the expert's assessment, this directly affects the construction of a defensive perimeter around energy facilities: to counter such systems, it is necessary to increase the number of navigation jamming assets and create large multi-module complexes around energy objects capable of "pushing through" the navigation channels of missiles, KABs, and Shahed-type UAVs alike.

### Fiber-optic drones and AI terminal guidance: threats that are changing the rules of the game

The second key direction in the adversary's evolution, as named by Yurkov, is the growing use of fiber-optic UAVs. The fundamental difference of such drones is that the fiber-optic control channel cannot be subjected to electronic jamming — traditional EW means are powerless here. At the same time, such vehicles have significant drawbacks: due to the presence of a cable, they are heavier, slower, and less maneuverable, and the cable itself can be severed. The third threat the expert named is the use of artificial intelligence for the automatic terminal guidance of FPV drones onto vehicle targets. In such a scenario, the operator first acquires the target, after which the drone continues guidance autonomously. After control is handed over to the AI, EW may lose its effectiveness, although, according to Yurkov, such cases are not yet widespread: the terminal guidance system still has significant shortcomings and often loses the target, especially when a vehicle is moving across terrain without distinct visual contrast. "The system is not yet sufficiently developed, but we see significant changes and understand that it will continue to develop," emphasized the co-founder of Contra-Drone.

### Optical detection as a complement, not a replacement, for EW

In response to fiber-optic and AI-controlled drones, Contra-Drone is developing an optical detection means for such targets. According to Yurkov, this complex was already presented at the "Defense of Ukraine" exhibition (DNV-1) and is currently undergoing testing. It is fundamentally important that this means is not autonomous: it will be used exclusively in conjunction with vehicle-mounted EW. "In other words, EW is not going anywhere," the expert emphasized. The optical means is intended to compensate for the fact that against skilled operators actively maneuvering at short range, interception remains difficult. By contrast, a fiber-optic drone in most cases moves in a more linear fashion, as do UAVs that have switched to automatic guidance using AI. "If the drone is moving linearly, as happens in most cases with fiber-optic or in almost all cases with artificial intelligence, the system is able to detect and destroy it in time," explained Yurkov. At the same time, he stressed that EW does not lose its significance: its effectiveness is especially noticeable at large distances between the UAV operator and the target, in particular at ranges beyond 7–10 km.

### Impact on ballistics and KABs: where EW works and where it does not

Alongside the main interview, RBC-Ukraine published an additional article in which EW developers explain why ballistic missiles and guided aerial bombs (KABs) represent a different category of task compared to drones. Unlike UAVs, which fly at low altitude along a predictable trajectory, ballistic and aeroballistic missiles spend a significant portion of their trajectory outside the range of ground-based EW systems. Nevertheless, according to Ukrainian specialists, Ukraine retains the ability to affect the navigation channels of such targets over certain segments of flight, which requires the creation of precisely those multi-module jamming perimeters that Yurkov spoke about in the context of protecting energy facilities.

### Contradictory data

No significant discrepancies in figures or chronology were found in the provided sources. At the same time, it should be noted that the information on the purchase of 20-channel CRPA systems in China was conveyed by Yurkov in the phrasing "according to our information," which indicates an intelligence or analytical source rather than a publicly confirmed fact. In addition, the assessment of the frequency of AI terminal guidance use ("not yet frequent") and the effectiveness of the optical complex, which is "undergoing testing," are expert judgments rather than recorded statistical data. Thus, both positions — about the growing threat and about the sustained effectiveness of EW — are consistent and complementary, forming no direct contradiction.

## 🔍 Fact-Check Verification

- [How EW affects "Banderols", ballistics, and KABs: an interview with the co-founder of Contra-Drone](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/k-reb-vplivae-banderoli-balistiku-ta-kabi-1787830840.html) - Основной источник. Интервью Тимофея Юркова: эволюция CRPA-антенн (4→8→12→16→20 каналов), оптоволоконные дроны, ИИ-донаведение, оптический комплекс на ДНВ-1, многомодульная защита энергообъектов.
- [It has become harder for Shaheds to break through into Kyiv: an expert explains how to scale this experience](https://www.unian.net/weapons/kiev-pvo-shahedam-stalo-slozhnee-prorvatsya-v-stolicu-novosti-kieva-13335966.html) - Контекстный источник о усложнении прорыва «Шахедов» и масштабировании опыта ПВО. Не содержит противоречий с основным материалом.
- [Tymofiy Yurkov](https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/authors/68d6c49902e7a/) - Страница автора. Подтверждает личность и аффилиацию Тимофея Юркова с Contra-Drone.
- [Why ballistics and KABs are harder to jam than drones: an explanation from an EW developer](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/chomu-balistiku-i-kabi-skladnishe-glushiti-1787903365.html) - Основной источник. Интервью Тимофея Юркова: эволюция CRPA-антенн (4→8→12→16→20 каналов), оптоволоконные дроны, ИИ-донаведение, оптический комплекс на ДНВ-1, многомодульная защита энергообъектов.

## ❓ FAQ

### Q: What are CRPA antennas and why do they complicate EW operations?
**A:** CRPA (Constantly Reconfigurable Phase Array) are phased antenna arrays capable of continuously reconfiguring their radiation pattern and filtering out interference. The more channels (modules) an antenna has, the harder it is to jam the navigation signal with electronic noise. Russia has progressed from 4-channel systems to 20-channel ones purchased from China, which requires increasing the power and number of jamming assets.

### Q: Why are fiber-optic drones immune to traditional EW?
**A:** The fiber-optic control channel transmits the signal over a physical cable (fiber-optic) rather than over a radio frequency. Since EW works by jamming radio signals, it has no effect on a fiber-optic channel. However, such drones are heavier, slower, and less maneuverable, and the cable can be severed.

### Q: What is Contra-Drone developing in response to fiber-optic drones?
**A:** Contra-Drone is developing an optical detection means for fiber-optic and AI-controlled drones. The complex was presented at the "Defense of Ukraine" exhibition (DNV-1) and is currently undergoing testing. It does not replace EW but complements it: the optical means detects linearly moving targets, while EW continues to work at long ranges.

### Q: How widespread is AI terminal guidance of FPV drones onto vehicle targets?
**A:** According to Tymofiy Yurkov, such cases are not yet frequent. The automatic terminal guidance system has significant shortcomings: the drone often loses the target on terrain without distinct visual contrast. Nevertheless, experts are tracking the development of the technology and forecasting increased use.

### Q: How is Ukraine protecting energy facilities from new navigation systems?
**A:** According to Contra-Drone, large multi-module navigation jamming systems are being created around energy objects, capable of "pushing through" the GNSS navigation channels of missiles, KABs, and Shahed-type UAVs simultaneously. This is necessary due to the growth in the number of channels in CRPA antennas up to 20.