---
title: "\"Cyber is just one tool\": Former head of NATO cyber center in Tallinn on Russia's planned attacks in the EU in 2027"
description: "Former head of the NATO cyber center in Tallinn Merle Maigre explained in an interview with RBC-Ukraine that the main EU threat from Russia is not isolated attacks, but their embedding into a hybrid campaign, and forecasted hacker targets for 2027."
date: 2026-11-19T09:05:15.785Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/former-nato-cyber-chief-russia-threats-eu-2027
tags: [cybersecurity, eu-russia, hybrid-warfare, critical-infrastructure, nato]
author: "Alexander Buran"
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# "Cyber is just one tool": Former head of NATO cyber center in Tallinn on Russia's planned attacks in the EU in 2027

![Supermarket employees checking and arranging frozen food in refrigerated display cases](https://xab.info/media/2026/11/19/eks-bylavha-kibercentra-nato-o-ugrozah-rossii-dlya-es-v-2027/eks-bylavha-kibercentra-nato-o-ugrozah-rossii-dlya-es-v-2027-1.webp)

## Key Points

- According to the former head of the NATO CCDCOE in Tallinn, the main challenge for the EU is not Russia's cyberattacks themselves, but their integration into a hybrid campaign with kinetic actions.
- In 2026, four threat vectors stand out: cyber espionage (UNC7005), critical infrastructure sabotage (FSB 16th Center, Turla), hacktivism and DDoS, and information manipulation (Matryoshka operation).
- For 2027, a continuation of the same scenarios in more sophisticated forms is predicted, with an emphasis on energy, transport, the public sector, media, and the financial sector.
- The threat landscape depends not on company size, but on its strategic sphere; for banks, the key threat is financially motivated and Ukraine-linked fraud networks.

In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, Merle Maigre, the former head of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn and head of the cybersecurity competence center at the e-Governance Academy, analyzed the threats Russia posed to the European Union throughout 2026 and provided a forecast for 2027. According to her assessment, Russia remained a key source of cyber threats to the EU, and there is nothing new in this — the trend simply continued. At the same time, the expert emphasizes, a cyberattack in itself is not the main problem; what is critical is the way it is woven into the broader picture of pressure on European states.

### A hybrid campaign, not isolated attacks

Maigre's central thesis is that the main challenge for the EU is not specific cyber incidents, but their integration into a hybrid campaign combining cyber means with kinetic actions: arson, espionage, damage to submarine cables in the Baltic Sea, and reconnaissance operations. In this logic, the cyber sphere acts as just one tool in the arsenal, alongside information manipulation and pressure on critical infrastructure. "This is not so much about specific threat vectors as it is about Russia's style of action," the expert formulates, pointing out that it is the systemic nature of the campaign that makes it more dangerous than any single attack.

### Four vectors of threats in 2026

Maigre identifies four main areas. The first is cyber espionage against governments, defense, and strategic industries. Around August 26, CERT-EU reported on a targeted phishing campaign against the European defense industry using malicious authentication lures; according to her, more precisely it was a Google Threat Intelligence report linking the campaign to the UNC7005 group, believed to be connected to Russia. The attackers impersonated a Finnish operational center: clicking the link brought up a "Sign in with Google" button, and the victim was redirected to a fake login page to steal authentication tokens, giving the attackers access to accounts. The second area is cyber sabotage of critical infrastructure. A striking marker was the statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas on July 13: according to her, the EU exposed the FSB's 16th Center, which directs a number of hacker groups, notably Turla, which attacked government networks of EU member states and sabotaged critical infrastructure. Previously, such attacks were directed against France, Germany, Poland, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Austria; in Poland, according to data cited by the expert, the 16th Center conducted destructive attacks on thermal and power plants. The third is pro-Russian hacktivism and DDoS campaigns, a long-standing and ongoing trend. The fourth is foreign information manipulation using cyber means and election interference: the Russia-linked Matryoshka operation spread fabricated content around elections in German federal states and purposefully targeted candidates in the 2027 French presidential election, and as Maigre notes, the French campaign is actually starting now.

### Forecast for 2027: The same, but more sophisticated

Answering the question of what to expect in 2027, the expert predicts a continuation of the same scenarios, possibly in more sophisticated forms. Energy, transport, the public sector, and media will remain familiar targets, and Maigre adds the financial sector to this list — in her phrasing, everything that is "the juiciest morsel" for hackers. Thus, the forecast is not based on the emergence of fundamentally new categories of targets, but on the complication of tactics and the expansion of the list of priority sectors.

### Different sectors — different threat landscapes

Speaking from an Estonian perspective, Maigre emphasizes that the threat landscape differs significantly for a bank, an energy or telecom company, and a defense startup. All of them face cybercrime, but their likelihood of attracting the attention of Russian state-linked actors varies, and the basic rule here is: what matters is not the size of the company, but the strategic sphere in which it operates. For banks, the threat is concentrated where the money is: the main danger is financially motivated criminals and fraud networks, and as the expert notes, in a number of cases these are Ukraine-linked organized groups that stole significant amounts from the accounts and savings of Estonian residents. In 2025–2026, several major investigations took place in which Ukrainian law enforcement agencies cooperate well, according to her; one of the most high-profile cases she names is that of Artur Yermolaev, whom Estonian investigators identified as the leader of a Ukraine-linked fraud network.

## Fact-Check & Sources

- [От холодильников до энергосистем: что будут атаковать хакеры РФ в ЕС в 2027 году](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/vid-holodilnikiv-energosistem-shcho-atakuvatimut-1795070200.html) - Primary source — interview of Merle Maigre to RBC-Ukraine; all article theses (hybrid campaign, four threat vectors, UNC7005, FSB 16th Center and Turla, Matryoshka operation, 2027 forecast, sectoral threats, and Yermolaev case) are taken from this text.

## FAQ

### What, according to the expert, is Russia's main threat to the EU?

Not individual cyberattacks, but how they are embedded into a broader hybrid campaign combining cyber means with kinetic actions — arson, espionage, cable damage in the Baltic Sea, and reconnaissance operations.

### Which EU sectors are at the highest risk in 2027?

The expert names energy, transport, the public sector, and media, and also adds the financial sector — everything that is the most attractive target for hackers.

### How do threats differ for various sectors?

According to Maigre, what matters is not the company's size, but its strategic sphere: for banks, the key threat is financially motivated criminals and fraud networks, including Ukraine-linked groups.