---
title: "Operation 'Postman': How Russian Intelligence Services Mass-Mail Fake Complaints to Ukrainian Government Agencies"
description: "Russian intelligence services (IPO, GRU, FSB) are conducting Operation 'Postman': in June–July 2026, more than 500 fake complaints in the name of fictitious and real citizens were sent to Ukrainian government agencies, with the aim of creating bureaucratic load and discrediting 17 military units."
date: 2026-09-01T14:08:04.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/postman-operation-russian-fake-complaints-ukrainian-agencies
tags: [russia, ukraine, information-warfare, disinformation, fsb, gru, military, cyber-operations]
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Operation 'Postman': How Russian Intelligence Services Mass-Mail Fake Complaints to Ukrainian Government Agencies

![Hooded figure at a computer in a dark room — illustration of the Russian special services' cyber operation 'Postman' mass-sending fake complaints to Ukrainian government agencies](https://xab.info/media/2026/09/01/operatsiya-pochtalon-feykovye-zhaloby-v-ukrainu/operatsiya-pochtalon-feykovye-zhaloby-v-ukrainu-1.webp)

## 🎯 Key Points

- In June–July 2026, Russian IPO, GRU, and FSB units dispatched more than 500 fake complaints to Ukrainian government agencies, receiving around 100 responses
- Operation 'Postman' is aimed at creating bureaucratic load and imitating public discontent
- 17 Ukrainian units with high morale were singled out for the targeted discrediting of their command
- According to the Disinformation Counteraction Center, a significant portion of the appeals are legally unsophisticated and do not oblige government agencies to react
- The causal link between fake complaints and real inspections of Ukrainian commanders has not been independently confirmed

Russian intelligence services have launched a large-scale information operation against Ukraine under the codename 'Postman,' in which appeals and complaints are mass-sent to Ukrainian government and law-enforcement bodies in the name of supposedly ordinary citizens. According to an RBK-Ukraine investigation, the operation involves units of the Russian Armed Forces' information-psychological operations (IPO) directorate, the GRU, and the FSB. In June and July 2026 alone, Russian operatives organized the dispatch of more than 500 complaints and appeals, receiving just under a hundred official responses from Ukrainian institutions in return.

### The Mechanics of Operation 'Postman'

The scheme is built on prior reconnaissance: Russian operatives collect personal data on Ukrainians, compile databases of both real and entirely fictitious citizens, and select contact details and email addresses. The appeals themselves are often based on real conflicts, tragedies, corruption scandals, mobilization problems, and other high-profile stories. Unverified details are added, along with an interpretation favorable to Russia, or causal links are deliberately distorted. In one of the letters reviewed by RBK-Ukraine, a supposed Ukrainian citizen was transmitting the coordinates of Russian military units on occupied territory — in this way, someone else's personal data is used to pass on fake information of a military nature.

### Scale and Recipients

The recipients of the dispatch include Ukraine's Ministry of Defence, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the President's Office, the Cabinet of Ministers, law-enforcement and anti-corruption bodies, Members of Parliament, and regional administrations. According to the outlet's sources, Russian operatives separately track the reaction of Ukrainian institutions and plan to increase the number of appeals to precisely those bodies that have already responded to previous letters. An official response serves as an indicator for Moscow that a given scenario has worked and can be repeated or scaled up. One of the key objectives of the operation is to create additional bureaucratic load: Ukrainian government agencies are forced to spend resources processing artificially generated signals. The second goal is to imitate public discontent, with similar theses supposedly voiced independently by 'citizens' from different regions and social groups.

### Strike Against Military Units

A separate and, according to experts, the most dangerous direction of the operation is activity against the defence forces. Russian appeals contain accusations of corruption among commanders, improper treatment of subordinates, illegal mobilization, and other violations. The enemy specifically singled out 17 Ukrainian units with a high moral-psychological state and concentrated its efforts on discrediting their command. As Major General Ilya Pavlenko explained, the Russians identify a military unit with high morale, effective commanders, and combat successes, and then search for the personal data of servicemembers or their relatives; if they cannot find it, they use fake documents and send complaints to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Special Investigation Service (SIS), and the prosecutor's office of the GUR MoD. In Russian military terminology, this tactic is called diverting resources to a 'worthless target': even if the violation described in the complaint is not confirmed, an inspection still comes to the unit, the unit is distracted from its main activities, and the command is discredited. Sometimes, during such inspections, a real but different case of violation is found, which is then used for propaganda purposes.

### Expert Assessment and Legal Nuances

Andrii Kovalenko, head of the Disinformation Counteraction Center, noted that a significant portion of the fake appeals are legally unsophisticated and do not create an obligation for government agencies to respond to them. 'These fake requests do come in to the inboxes, but they are, as a rule, written in a legally unsophisticated way. And, honestly, a number of them do not comply with any legislation that could oblige a response to such things. So in this case, this story is ineffective,' Kovalenko stated. Nevertheless, even appeals that are legally ineffective generate information noise and force agencies to spend time on the initial sorting and verification of each signal.

### Contradictory Data

In Russian internal [sources], some of these complaints were linked to the start of inspections against Ukrainian commanders, however RBK-Ukraine did not independently confirm this causal link. Thus, the claim that fake appeals directly trigger official investigations remains at the level of statements by the Russian side and has not received independent verification. On the other hand, the very fact of receiving around a hundred responses to 500+ appeals confirms that some of the signals do reach their recipients and are processed, although this does not necessarily lead to full-scale inspections.

## 🔍 Fact-Check Verification

- [Russia is running the 'Postman' special operation due to fake appeals from Ukrainians, - RBK-Ukraine](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/rosiya-provodit-spetsoperatsiyu-pochtalon-1788271504.html) - Первичный источник расследования. Подтверждает существование операции, масштаб (500+ жалоб за июнь–июль 2026), задействованные структуры (ИПСО, ГРУ, ФСБ), список адресатов, 17 целевых подразделений. Не подтверждает независимо причинную связь между жалобами и реальными проверками командиров.
- [Assassination of Alekseev: what do the people called 'killers' by the Russian FSB, recruited ... say](https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/743154-pokushenie-na-generala-strelki-v-alekseeva-yakoby-deystvovali-s-sbu-video) - Подтверждено по источнику focus.ua
- [FSB released footage of the interrogation of a new suspect in the case of the assassination attempt on Alekseev](https://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/02/2026/698b178f9a79474b0af0fda0) - Подтверждено по источнику rbc.ru
- [FSB reported the detention of a third accomplice in the assassination attempt on General Alekseev](https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8420519) - Подтверждено по источнику kommersant.ru

## ❓ FAQ

### Q: What is Operation 'Postman'?
**A:** It is an information operation by Russian intelligence services (IPO of the Russian Armed Forces, GRU, FSB) in which fake complaints and appeals are mass-sent to Ukrainian government and law-enforcement bodies in the name of supposedly ordinary Ukrainians, with the aim of creating bureaucratic load and imitating public discontent.

### Q: How many fake complaints were sent and to whom?
**A:** In June and July 2026 alone, the dispatch of more than 500 appeals was organized. The recipients were the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the President's Office, the Cabinet of Ministers, law-enforcement and anti-corruption bodies, Members of Parliament, and regional administrations. Around a hundred responses were received.

### Q: How does the operation affect military units?
**A:** Russian operatives singled out 17 Ukrainian units with a high moral-psychological state and direct complaints against their command containing accusations of corruption and violations. Even if the accusation is fictitious, an inspection may come to the unit, distracting it from its main activities.

### Q: How effective is this operation from a legal standpoint?
**A:** According to Andrii Kovalenko, head of the Disinformation Counteraction Center, a significant portion of the fake appeals are legally unsophisticated and do not create an obligation for government agencies to respond. However, around 100 responses confirm that some of the signals are nevertheless processed.

### Q: Has the link between fake complaints and real inspections of commanders been confirmed?
**A:** No. In Russian internal [sources], some complaints were linked to the start of inspections, however RBK-Ukraine did not independently confirm this causal link. This question remains open.