---
title: "Second batch of 'Rassvet' satellites fails to reach operational orbit: ISW notes the failure of Russia's Starlink analog"
description: "ISW and the N2YO tracker confirm: none of the 16 satellites in the second 'Rassvet' batch, launched on July 19, reached operational orbit. Moscow is not ready for the pace of deploying its Starlink analog."
date: 2026-09-01T06:28:00.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/rassvet-second-batch-satellites-failure-isw
tags: [rassvet-satellites, starlink, bureau-1440, russia-ukraine, space-launch, military-communications]
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Second batch of 'Rassvet' satellites fails to reach operational orbit: ISW notes the failure of Russia's Starlink analog

![Rassvet communications satellite in Earth orbit — Russian Starlink analog that failed to reach working orbit](https://xab.info/media/2026/09/01/rassvet-vtoraya-partiya-sputnikov-proval-isw/rassvet-vtoraya-partiya-sputnikov-proval-isw-1.webp)

## 🎯 Key Points

- The second batch of 16 'Rassvet' satellites (launched July 19, 2026) had not reached operational altitude as of August 31; most spacecraft are at 300–400 km, and two, according to data, are heading toward atmospheric re-entry.
- Of the first batch (March 24, 2026), 12 out of 16 spacecraft reached 550 km; they provide troops with up to 1.5 hours of communication twice a day over Ukraine.
- The source contains an inconsistency in the target orbit: 550 km versus 870 km — the exact profile of the second batch is unconfirmed.
- Ukrainian strikes on 'Progress' (August 15) and Plesetsk (August 23) threaten launch-vehicle production and launches; round-the-clock communication requires 200–300 satellites, and the project depends on imports and lacks its own radiation-resistant chips.

According to a report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), cited by RBC-Ukraine, the second batch of 16 satellites from Russia's 'Rassvet' constellation, launched into orbit on July 19, 2026, has failed to reach its planned operational altitude. The N2YO satellite tracker shows that, as of August 31, none of the spacecraft had climbed to the 550-kilometer mark, while most of the satellites were at altitudes of 300 to 400 kilometers. Some of the spacecraft are already losing their orbit, and at least two, according to available information, are heading toward re-entry into Earth's atmosphere. For comparison: of the first batch, launched on March 24, 2026, 12 out of 16 spacecraft reached the required altitude, and by the end of August they were still holding at 550 km.

### Contradictory data

The primary materials contain an inconsistency in the figures for the target orbit. On the one hand, the operational altitude that the satellites are supposed to reach and that the first batch maintains is given as 550 kilometers. On the other hand, the same description of the second batch states that 300–400 km is 'significantly below the planned 870 kilometers.' Both values are cited within the same report, and neither is confirmed by any independent public statement from the developer. As a result, the exact target orbital profile for the second batch remains unclear: either an error was made in the text, or different altitudes were specified for different batches/subsystems. Until these figures are clarified, they should be treated with caution.

### What this means for troops on the front

The key consequence of the satellites' low position is a shortened operational lifespan. The lower a spacecraft flies, the more strongly it is slowed by the upper atmosphere, and the faster its fuel and resources for maintaining orbit are consumed. Nevertheless, the existing constellation of 12 operational spacecraft from the first batch poses a real threat: it provides Russian troops with up to an hour and a half of communication with ground terminals twice a day over Ukrainian territory. Even in such short windows, the link allows for more precise guidance of remotely piloted drones. According to analysts, it was precisely the loss of access to Starlink on February 1, 2026, that pushed Moscow to accelerate the deployment of its own 'Rassvet' system.

### Strikes on launch infrastructure

The failure of the second batch coincided with a series of Ukrainian strikes on the infrastructure on which the launch of the spacecraft depends. On the night of August 15, facilities of the 'Progress' Rocket and Space Center, which produces 'Soyuz'-type launch vehicles, were attacked. On August 23, Ukraine attempted a strike on the Plesetsk Cosmodrome — two days before a 'Soyuz-2.1b' rocket carrying the GLONASS-K1 satellite was launched from there. It was from Plesetsk that Russia launched both batches of 'Rassvet,' so strikes on this hub threaten not only the production of launch vehicles but also the very ability to place new spacecraft into orbit.

### Ambitious plans and real constraints

The system's developer, the aerospace company 'Bureau 1440,' had announced plans to carry out 'dozens' more launches and add 'hundreds' of new spacecraft. Under the plan, the constellation was to grow to 156 spacecraft by the end of 2026 and to 292 satellites by 2030. However, for stable round-the-clock communication over Ukraine, an estimated 200 to 300 operational satellites are required, and Moscow is unlikely to achieve this within a compressed timeframe. The main reason is a shortage of launch vehicles amid strikes on production and launch facilities. The project's cost is estimated at roughly $6.1 billion; behind 'Bureau 1440' stand the resources of the major X Holding conglomerate and, according to reports, ties to Russian intelligence services.

### Dependence on imports and the absence of domestic chips

Researchers had previously pointed to the project's critical dependence on imported components. In 2025, 'Bureau 1440' spent nearly $68 million on foreign purchases, with a significant share of the supplies coming from China. Russia has still not developed its own radiation-resistant microchips: the announced tenders for their development received not a single application. The combination of these factors — the failure of the second batch, strikes on launch vehicles, and technological dependence — indicates that further delays in the deployment of the 'Rassvet' constellation should be expected in the near term.

## 🔍 Fact-Check Verification

- [Russia's Starlink analog has failed. ISW speaks about the fate of the 'Rassvet' satellites](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/rosiyskiy-analog-starlink-provalivsya-isw-1788243865.html) - Первичный источник нарратива: даты запусков (19.07, 24.03), данные N2YO по высотам, удары по «Прогрессу» и Плесецку, стоимость проекта, планы по числу аппаратов. Содержит нестыжку 550/870 км.
- ['This is not a copy of Starlink, but the next stage.' Russia places its first 'Rassvet' satellites in orbit](https://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2026/03/24/22689013.shtml) - Контекст запуска первой партии (24.03.2026) и позиция российской стороны о статусе проекта.
- [Russia places its first 'Rassvet' communication satellites in orbit — Bloomberg calls them a potential ...](https://www.business-gazeta.ru/news/697931) - Контекст запуска первой партии (24.03.2026) и позиция российской стороны о статусе проекта.
- [Russia prepares to launch a second batch of satellites dubbed Starlink analogs, – media](https://www.unian.net/war/sputniki-rassvet-rossiya-gotovit-k-zapusku-vtoruyu-partiyu-svoih-analogov-starlink-13437354.html) - Контекст подготовки и запуска второй партии спутников.

## ❓ FAQ

### Q: How many satellites in the second 'Rassvet' batch reached operational orbit?
**A:** According to the N2YO tracker data cited in the ISW report, as of August 31, 2026, none of the 16 spacecraft in the second batch had reached the planned operational altitude; most ended up at 300–400 km, and at least two are heading toward atmospheric re-entry.

### Q: How does the 550 km operational altitude differ from the mentioned 870 km?
**A:** The report text contains an inconsistency: the first batch's operational altitude is given as 550 km, while for the second batch 300–400 km is described as 'below the planned 870 km.' The exact target profile of the second batch has not been publicly confirmed, so these figures are treated with caution.

### Q: What communication do Russian troops get from the first 'Rassvet' batch?
**A:** The 12 operational spacecraft of the first batch provide up to an hour and a half of communication with ground terminals twice a day over Ukrainian territory, which is enough for more precise guidance of remotely piloted drones.

### Q: How many satellites are needed for round-the-clock communication, and what is lacking?
**A:** An estimated 200 to 300 operational satellites are required. The constraints are a shortage of launch vehicles after strikes on 'Progress' and Plesetsk, dependence on imported components, and the absence of domestic radiation-resistant microchips.