---
title: "Tactical shift: how the deactivation of repeaters is changing the nature of attacks on Kyiv and western regions"
description: "The tactics of attacks on Kyiv and western Ukraine are changing: repeaters in the border zone have been deactivated. Drones are switching to autonomous GPS flight, changing the rules of the game for air defense. 🚁📡🛡️"
date: 2026-06-26T18:53:02.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/tactical-shift-deactivation-of-repeaters-changes-attacks-on-kyiv-and-western-regions
tags: []
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Tactical shift: how the deactivation of repeaters is changing the nature of attacks on Kyiv and western regions

![Military drone relay deactivation system on airfield: key to changing attack tactics on Kyiv](https://xab.info/media/2026/06/26/izmenenie-taktiki-vozdushnyh-atak-posle-deaktivacii-retrotranslyatorov/izmenenie-taktiki-vozdushnyh-atak-posle-deaktivacii-retrotranslyatorov-1.webp)

A fundamental change in the tactics of applying strike assets is taking place in the airspace of Ukraine. According to data from the Main Directorate of Intelligence and a statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, on June 22 of the current year, key communication relay nodes ceased to function on the territory of the neighboring Republic of Belarus.

This event, confirmed by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, entails a restructuring of the entire technical control loop for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Deactivation of communication infrastructure eliminates the possibility of operational maneuvering of drones in real-time, which significantly changes the nature of threats for Kyiv and the western regions of the country.

### Technological gap: from mesh networks to autonomous flight

Until recently, the control system for strike drones was based on complex infrastructure. Specialized transceivers and directional antennas deployed on high-altitude objects — telecommunication masts and cellular towers from 45 to 70 meters high — were used to transmit signals.

This equipment ensured the operation of mesh networks, linking operators with UAV onboard modems. The presence of a stable radio channel allowed overcoming line-of-sight limitations and controlling devices at significant distances. Operators could see streaming video in real-time, correct routes, identify radar station positions, and guide drones to mobile targets, including locomotives and air defense system elements.

### Consequences for the operational situation

Sergey Beskrestnov ("Flash"), an advisor to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on technological issues, notes that the loss of communication channels narrows the functionality of strike UAVs to standard algorithms. Without the possibility of real-time telemetry, the guidance of "Shahed" or "Gerber" type devices switches to autonomous flight mode along pre-programmed GPS coordinates.

The transition to rigid programming of flight tasks creates a new configuration of threats and protection opportunities:

    - **Exclusion of operational reconnaissance.** Transmission of visual and radio-technical data from the UAV during the mission ceases. This reduces the possibility of verifying strike results and operational target selection.

    - **Fixation of trajectories.** Routes of movement become immutable. This facilitates the calculation of interception azimuths for mobile fire groups and stationary air defense means, making the attack trajectory more predictable.

    - **Increased vulnerability to EW.** Devices fully dependent on satellite navigation become more susceptible to spatial suppression technologies and coordinate spoofing (GPS data substitution).

Thus, the deactivation of border control infrastructure shifts air attacks from the category of flexible, real-time controlled operations to the category of autonomous strikes on rigidly defined coordinates.