---
title: "\"Crimean Syndrome\": Turchynov Responds to Zelenskyy's Thesis on \"Dozens of People\" in Crimea 2014"
description: "Former acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, in a column for RBC-Ukraine, refuted Zelenskyy's thesis about \"dozens of people\" in Crimea-2014, calling the occupation a planned operation amid the catastrophic state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine."
date: 2026-10-27T12:00:25.401Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/turchynov-crimean-syndrome-zelenskyy-dozens-people-crimea-2014
tags: [crimea-2014, turchinov, zelensky, ukraine-russia, military-history, rbc-ukraine]
author: "Alexander Buran, Andrey Kosynko"
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# "Crimean Syndrome": Turchynov Responds to Zelenskyy's Thesis on "Dozens of People" in Crimea 2014

![Armed Russian military personnel in unmarked uniforms on positions in Crimea in 2014](https://xab.info/media/2026/10/27/turchinov-krymskij-sindrom-zelenskiy-desyatki-lyudej-krym-2014/turchinov-krymskij-sindrom-zelenskiy-desyatki-lyudej-krym-2014-1.webp)

## Key Points

- Turchynov answered Zelenskyy's statement about "dozens of people" entering Crimea in 2014 in his column "Crimean Syndrome" for RBC-Ukraine
- The former acting president argues that the occupation was a planned operation practiced during the Zapad-2013 exercises, rather than an improvised invasion
- Turchynov provides data on the state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: out of 36 SAM systems by February 2014, only 10 were operational, and the defense budget dropped to 0.94% of GDP
- The column contains a harsh assessment of the leadership at the time, who, according to the author, "fled to Russia" instead of organizing defense

Former acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov published an author's column titled "Crimean Syndrome" in RBC-Ukraine, in which he thoroughly analyzed Volodymyr Zelenskyy's statements regarding the events of 2014. The publication was triggered by the incumbent president's remarks in an interview with The Diary of a CEO (according to TSN), where he stated that "dozens of people entered Crimea" and that "defeating the Russians at that time was not difficult at all." Turchynov, who headed the state in February 2014 during the political crisis, called such assessments "deep analytics" and presented his own version of why Ukraine failed to repel the peninsula's occupation.

### "Dozens of People" vs. a Planned Operation

The central element of the column is criticism of Zelenskyy's phrasing regarding the scale of the Russian presence in Crimea in 2014. According to Turchynov, similar theses "performed by various kinds of experts" regularly appear in pro-government media, but, he asserts, they do not correspond to the actual state of affairs. The former acting president insists that the peninsula's occupation was not an improvised invasion by "identifier-less" soldiers, but part of a meticulously developed plan which, according to him, was supposed to culminate in the complete capture of Ukraine as early as April 2014. Turchynov emphasizes: "History can be distorted, retouched, concealed, but it cannot be changed."

### Zapad-2013 Exercises and the Chronology of Capture

The column references the strategic exercises of the Armed Forces of Russia and Belarus "Zapad-2013", held in October 2013, which, the author claims, served as a training ground for a "multi-service force grouping" to practice the details of capturing Ukraine. Turchynov dates the actual beginning of Crimea's capture to February 20, 2014 — the day when, he says, "the blood of the Heavenly Hundred heroes flowed on the Maidan." He claims that Russian troops took advantage of "lawlessness, chaos, and large-scale crises gripping the country." The column also contains a harsh assessment of the actions of the leadership at the time: "Instead of organizing the defense of Ukraine, the president, the heads of the Cabinet, the Ministry of Defense, the SBU, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, intelligence, internal troops, the PGO, ministries, many state institutions, and local administrations fled to Russia and began in every possible way to facilitate military aggression against their own country."

### Military-Economic Potential of the Parties in 2014

Turchynov provides specific figures characterizing Russia's military potential at the time the occupation began. According to his data, the total number of all Russian military formations in February 2014 was 3.4 million people, of which about one million belonged to the regular army, and two million men were in the military reserve. The author of the column also points to the completion of rearmament and reform of the armed forces in the Russian Federation, as well as the preparation of "numerous paramilitary Cossack and veteran organizations" to carry out occupation tasks. At the same time, he emphasizes that the Russia of 2014 and the Russia of 2022 are "the exact same cruel and unprincipled Russia," acting "headed by the very same Putin."

### Sale of Arsenals and the State of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

A significant part of the column is devoted to the state of the Ukrainian army on the eve of 2014. Turchynov claims that since the early 1990s, "the best equipment and weaponry were predatorily sold off or simply destroyed": tanks, according to him, were sold "at the price of passenger cars," and anti-aircraft missile systems were sold off "at prices a hundred times lower than market value." A key indicator he cites: out of 36 SAM systems not yet sold off by February 2014, only 10 could perform combat missions, which, in his estimation, did not provide even fragmentary defense against aviation. The column also mentions the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for "empty paper scraps of the Budapest Memorandum," the sale of strategic bombers and cruise missiles, and corruption schemes involving the distribution of land and military facilities. The defense budget, according to the author, was 1.08% of GDP in 2011 and 0.94% in 2012; the figure for 2013 is cut off in the provided text.

### Political Context and Resonance

Turchynov's column came out against the backdrop of an ongoing discussion about the reasons for the 2014 failure and whether the full-scale war that began in 2022 could have been avoided. Zelenskyy's statement about "dozens of people" in Crimea caused a wide resonance in Ukrainian society and among politicians, which likely triggered the publication of a detailed rebuttal by one of the key participants in the 2014 events. Turchynov, who served as acting president during the most critical period, possesses a unique "from the inside" perspective of that crisis, which gives his arguments additional weight in public discussion. At the same time, the text of the column itself is strongly journalistic and evaluative in nature, and a number of statements contained within it — particularly concerning specific numerical parameters and the motives of the parties' actions — remain a subject of discussion among historians and military analysts.

## Accounts differ

### Scale of the Russian military presence in Crimea in 2014

- **Volodymyr Zelenskyy (interview with The Diary of a CEO, TSN version):** "Dozens of people" entered Crimea in 2014, which was "zero" and "nothing" for Ukraine, and defeating them was "not difficult at all." ([rbc.ua](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/krim-2014-rotsi-chomu-ukrayina-mogla-zupiniti-1793098176.html))
- **Oleksandr Turchynov (column "Crimean Syndrome", RBC-Ukraine):** The occupation of Crimea was a planned operation of a multi-service force grouping, practiced at the "Zapad-2013" exercises, with a total potential of 3.4 million Russian military formations and prepared paramilitary structures. ([rbc.ua](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/krim-2014-rotsi-chomu-ukrayina-mogla-zupiniti-1793098176.html))

*Where they agree:* Russian military units entered the territory of Crimea in 2014 and ensured the occupation of the peninsula — this fact is recognized by both parties.

## Fact-Check & Sources

- [Крым в 2014 году: почему Украина не могла остановить оккупацию](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/krim-2014-rotsi-chomu-ukrayina-mogla-zupiniti-1793098176.html) - Primary source — author's column by O. Turchynov "Crimean Syndrome". All quotes and figures (3.4 million, 36/10 SAM systems, 1.08%/0.94% of GDP, "Zapad-2013", 20.02.2014) are given in the text of the column and presented with attribution. Zelenskyy's quote from the interview with The Diary of a CEO (TSN version) is also cited through the text of the column. The text cuts off at the 2013 figure. The author's evaluative judgments are preserved as his position.
- [Крым не "серый": что перепутали в ООН на новой карте мира и почему возмутилась Украина](https://focus.ua/world/766863-krym-eto-ukraina-pochemu-ukrainskaya-delegaciya-ne-podderzhala-rezolyuciyu-oon-o-novoy-karte-mira) - The source concerns the incident with the Equal Earth map at the UN (September 2025) and contains no facts directly related to the topic of Turchynov's column. Not used in the text of the article.

## FAQ

### What exactly did Zelenskyy say about Crimea in 2014?

In an interview with The Diary of a CEO (according to TSN), Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that "dozens of people entered Crimea," which was "zero" and "nothing" for Ukraine, and that "defeating the Russians at that time was not difficult at all." He also said that had there been an order to defend the country in 2014, a full-scale war in its current form would not have happened.

### How does Turchynov react to these statements?

Oleksandr Turchynov in his column "Crimean Syndrome" for RBC-Ukraine calls such assessments "deep analytics" and argues that the occupation of Crimea was a planned operation practiced during the Zapad-2013 exercises, rather than an improvised invasion by a small number of soldiers. He emphasizes that Ukraine entered 2014 with a catastrophically weakened army.

### What figures does Turchynov cite regarding the state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2014?

According to Turchynov, out of 36 anti-aircraft missile systems not yet sold off by February 2014, only 10 could perform combat missions. The defense budget was 1.08% of GDP in 2011 and 0.94% in 2012. He also points to the mass sale of tanks, SAM systems, strategic bombers, and cruise missiles.

### When, according to Turchynov's version, did the capture of Crimea begin?

Turchynov dates the beginning of the actual capture of the peninsula to February 20, 2014, indicating that Russian troops took advantage of the political crisis and "lawlessness" against the backdrop of the Maidan events.