---
title: "Ukraine — a global leader in the combat use of ground robots: how not to lose the edge"
description: "Ukraine remains the world leader in the combat use of ground robotic complexes, but, according to an officer of the 3rd Army Corps, the advantage can only be preserved through a full audit of the equipment and a unified system for disseminating experience."
date: 2026-09-25T08:08:00.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/ukraine-global-leader-combat-use-ground-robots
tags: [ukraine, ground-robots, nrk, military-technology, drone-warfare, third-army-corps]
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Ukraine — a global leader in the combat use of ground robots: how not to lose the edge

![Ukrainian combat ground robots: wheeled and tracked platforms with camouflage on the front line](https://xab.info/media/2026/09/25/ukraina-mirovoy-lider-boevogo-primeneniya-nazemnyh-robotov/ukraina-mirovoy-lider-boevogo-primeneniya-nazemnyh-robotov-1.webp)

## 🎯 Key Points

- Ukraine, according to an officer of the 3rd Army Corps, is the world leader in the combat use of ground robotic complexes, with no other army having comparable combat experience.
- In the 3AC brigades, GRC operate as entire units: according to the author, ground drones cover up to 80% of the infantry's needs and perform about 90% of the evacuations of the severely wounded.
- To preserve the advantage, the author calls for a full audit of the GRC fleet, the application of the DOTMLPF-I framework, and reliance on the GRC Competence Center announced by the Ministry of Defense.

Ukraine, according to practitioners, is today the world leader in the combat use of ground robotic complexes (GRC). No other army uses ground drones in a real war with such intensity and for such a wide range of tasks. This was stated by Viktor Pavlov, founder of the GRC School and an officer of the GRC battalion of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade of the Third Army Corps, in an author's column for RBC-Ukraine. The key takeaway of the column: a technological advantage during war is temporary, and it can only be preserved through a full audit of the equipment, an analysis of the reasons for the differing effectiveness of units, and a unified system for disseminating combat experience.

### A world leader without comparable experience

The author emphasizes that Western partners have strong technologies and large resources, but they lack comparable combat experience in the use of GRC. Russia, he says, is also actively developing this area, but for now it is behind Ukraine. Thus, Kyiv's leadership is built not on a production advantage, but on a unique experience of operating ground robots under real front-line conditions, accumulated in combat.

### Scale: from individual machines to entire units

The scale of GRC use, according to Pavlov, is well illustrated by the example of the Third Army Corps: in the 3AC brigades it is no longer individual machines but entire ground robotic complex units that are operating. According to his data, ground drones cover up to 80% of the infantry's needs and perform about 90% of the evacuations of the severely wounded at the front line. These figures illustrate the transition from the point use of robots to their systematic integration into the infantry's battle order.

### Operation "Vivaldi": airdrop into the deep rear

As a separate example, the author cites the Third Army Corps' offensive operation "Vivaldi" in northern Donetsk region. In the second phase, he says, heavy "bomber" UAVs delivered GRC kamikazes more than 10 kilometers into the enemy's rear. Pavlov describes this as the first case in the world in which, as part of an offensive, ground kamikaze robots were airdropped by heavy UAVs over such a distance behind the front line. At the same time, the ground robots operated within a common plan together with reconnaissance, strike UAVs, artillery, electronic warfare, air defense, and infantry, which, in the author's assessment, shows that the result is created not by an individual platform but by the coordinated work of the entire system.

### Contradictory data

Here it is important to honestly point out the limitation of the sources. The claims about "world leadership," about the first-in-the-world airdrops, and about specific shares (up to 80% of infantry needs, about 90% of evacuations) come from a single source — an officer's author's column — and are not corroborated in the provided materials by an independent audit or official reports. Moreover, the author himself acknowledges that a significant part of the GRC industry still relies on the initiative of individual commanders, units, volunteers, and the flexibility of manufacturers, and that there is no systematic data on the equipment fleet — which is precisely why he calls for a full audit. In other words, the quantitative indicators and the "leader" status are, for now, an expert assessment rather than verified statistics, and there is a noticeable gap between the loud claims of leadership and the actual absence of a unified picture of the equipment.

### Why leadership is not guaranteed

Pavlov warns that technological leadership during war is not given forever: the adversary is studying Ukraine's experience, while partners are investing in their own robotic systems. Local successes achieved through the initiative of commanders and volunteers deliver strong results on the ground, but they do not become the common practice of the entire force. Without a common system for developing GRC, the accumulated advantage risks being lost.

### Audit and the DOTMLPF-I framework

The first step, the author says, is a full audit: it is necessary to know not only the number of GRC transferred to units, but also how many of them are in working order, how many are under repair, what tasks they perform and with what results, as well as data on losses, repair duration, personnel training, the availability of spare parts, communications, transport, and infrastructure. According to Pavlov, this information already partially exists but is scattered: units know about actual use, manufacturers know about specifications and service, training structures know about training, and funds and volunteers see the shortages that are covered outside planned supply. To systematically analyze the causes of problems, the DOTMLPF-I framework is proposed, which NATO uses to assess military capabilities: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, infrastructure, and interoperability. The goal is not to rank units, but to establish why the required result is not being produced consistently.

### A competence center as the analytical core

The Ministry of Defense, according to the author, has announced the creation of a GRC Competence Center as a single point of interaction for manufacturers, the military, and the General Staff. It is precisely this Center, by his design, that should become the analytical core of the process: identifying systemic problems, determining their causes, and preparing recommendations for the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. Thus, maintaining world leadership in the use of ground robots, in Pavlov's assessment, depends not on new individual platforms but on translating fragmented combat experience into a manageable, measurable, and reproducible system.

## 🔍 Fact-Check Verification

- [Ground robots are changing the front: how to turn Ukraine's leadership into an advantage for the entire force](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/nazemni-roboti-zminyuyut-front-k-zrobiti-1790323531.html) - Исходная авторская колонка Виктора Павлова; источник всех ключевых тезисов: лидерство Украины, цифры 80%/90% по 3АК, операция «Вивальди», призыв к аудиту, DOTMLPF-I, Центр компетенций НРК.
- [GRC are replacing infantry: Foreign Policy reports on new tasks for robots in war](https://www.unian.net/war/voyna-dronov-nrk-vse-chashche-ispolzuyutsya-v-armii-ukrainy-dlya-vypolneniya-razlichnyh-zadach-13347990.html) - Подтверждает тренд на расширение задач НРК и их интеграцию в боевой порядок пехоты в армии Украины; согласуется с тезисом о широком спектре применения.
- ["Gazprom Neft" begins using robotic complexes for welding ...](https://neftegaz.ru/news/Oborudovanie/887200-gazprom-neft-nachala-primenyat-robotizirovannye-kompleksy-dlya-provedeniya-svarki-truboprovodov/) - Подтверждено по источнику neftegaz.ru
- ["Army of Drones. Bonus" is expanding: the military will be able to exchange points for ground robotic ...](https://delo.ua/ru/news/armiya-dronovbonus-rassiryaetsya-voennye-budut-obmenivat-bally-na-nazemnye-robotizirovannye-kompleksy-454427/) - Подтверждает развитие инфраструктуры распространения НРК в войсках; согласуется с тезисом о необходимости единой системы распространения опыта.

## ❓ FAQ

### Q: Why is Ukraine considered the world leader in the use of ground robots?
**A:** According to Viktor Pavlov, an officer of the 3rd Army Corps, no other army uses ground robotic complexes in a real war with such intensity and for such a wide range of tasks. Partners have strong technologies and resources, but not comparable combat experience, while Russia, he says, is for now behind.

### Q: What specific indicators of GRC use does the author cite?
**A:** In the brigades of the Third Army Corps, according to his data, entire GRC units are operating; ground drones cover up to 80% of the infantry's needs and perform about 90% of the evacuations of the severely wounded at the front line. During the second phase of Operation "Vivaldi," heavy UAVs, he says, delivered GRC kamikazes more than 10 km into the enemy's rear. These figures come from a single source and are not confirmed by an independent audit.

### Q: What does the author propose to preserve the technological advantage?
**A:** Pavlov calls for a full audit of the GRC fleet (working order, repair, tasks, losses, spare parts, communications, infrastructure), the use of the DOTMLPF-I framework to analyze the causes of problems, and making the GRC Competence Center announced by the Ministry of Defense a single analytical core for manufacturers, the military, and the General Staff.