---
title: "Within 13 Days, Ukrainian Armed Forces Strike Russian Refineries Accounting for 36% of Processing Capacity"
description: "Between Oct 30 and Nov 11, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked at least nine Russian refineries with a combined capacity of over 120 million tons per year—representing 36% of Russia's refining capacity, according to Fire Point."
date: 2026-11-12T09:58:13.329Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/ukraine-strikes-russian-refineries-36-percent
tags: [ukraine-war, oil-refineries, fire-point, russia, military-strikes, fuel-market]
author: "Roman V."
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Within 13 Days, Ukrainian Armed Forces Strike Russian Refineries Accounting for 36% of Processing Capacity

![Nighttime explosion and fire at a Russian oil refinery after a drone strike](https://xab.info/media/2026/11/12/ukraina-ataka-npz-rossii-36-moshchnostei/ukraina-ataka-npz-rossii-36-moshchnostei-1.webp)

## Key Points

- Over 13 days (Oct 30 – Nov 11, 2026), at least 9 Russian refineries were hit by Ukrainian forces
- The total nominal capacity of the affected plants exceeds 120 million tons of oil per year
- According to Fire Point calculations, this accounts for 36% of all Russian oil refining capacity
- Strikes spanned the Volga region, central Russia, Krasnodar Krai, and the Leningrad Oblast
- Nominal capacity does not equal actual refining loss—real consequences depend on the extent of damage

Between October 30 and November 11, 2026, the Ukrainian Defense Forces launched strikes against at least nine Russian oil refineries. According to Fire Point, the total nominal capacity of the affected enterprises exceeds 120 million tons of oil per year. RBC-Ukraine reported this on November 12, citing a statement from Fire Point analysts. Based on the company's calculations, facilities accounting for 36% of Russia's total oil refining potential—more than a third—were targeted in under two weeks.

### Geography of Strikes: From the Volga Region to the Leningrad Oblast

According to the list provided by Fire Point, enterprises in various Russian regions came under attack during the specified period. The strikes covered facilities in the Volga region, central Russia, Krasnodar Krai, and the Leningrad Oblast. Such geographical dispersion indicates that the strikes targeted multiple industrial hubs simultaneously rather than a single cluster, complicating recovery logistics and the redistribution of raw material flows between plants.

### Deployment of Fire Point Weapons

Fire Point explained that the Ukrainian Defense Forces used weapons developed and supplied by the company for these successful new attacks. Fire Point positions itself as a private company involved in the development and supply of weaponry for the Ukrainian armed forces. The claim linking specific refinery strikes to their products is part of the company's public communication and has not been confirmed by independent technical assessments available at the time of publication.

### Nominal Capacity Versus Actual Consequences

Fire Point analysts emphasize an important methodological point: the nominal capacity of the plants does not mean that the entire refining volume was lost as a result of the attacks. Real consequences for the fuel market and logistics chains depend on the nature of the damage, specific damaged units (primary processing, secondary cracking units, hydrotreating), and the duration of plant downtime. Thus, the figure of 120 million tons per year reflects the design potential of the affected facilities rather than the current actual loss of refining.

### Context: A Series of Air Operations in November

The strikes on refining infrastructure were part of a broader series of air operations by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. RBC-Ukraine previously reported that a recent attack on St. Petersburg resulted in the deaths of Russian pilots. Additionally, a massive air raid by the Defense Forces on Russian territory was recorded on the night of November 11. The combination of these events points to a steady trend of strikes against fuel and energy sector facilities in recent weeks.

### What This Means for the Market and Logistics

Hitting facilities that account for over a third of the country's refining capacity inevitably puts pressure on domestic fuel chains and export flows. However, as analysts note, assessing the actual impact requires monitoring actual refining volumes, repair schedules, and the operation of backup capacities. Under conditions where strikes are dispersed across multiple regions simultaneously, prompt restoration of the full refining cycle at each plant requires significant resources and time.

## Fact-Check & Sources

- [Украина за 13 дней атаковала более трети всех нефтеперерабатывающих мощностей РФ](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/ukrayina-13-dniv-atakuvala-ponad-tretinu-1794474314.html) - The only source provided. Data on the number of refineries, capacity, and the 36% share are cited from a statement by Fire Point. Independent verification of the list of plants and actual damage volumes is absent in the source.

## FAQ

### How many refineries were specifically attacked during the specified period?

According to Fire Point data cited by RBC-Ukraine, at least nine Russian oil refineries came under attack between October 30 and November 11.

### What does the figure of 120 million tons per year mean?

This is the total nominal (design) capacity of the affected enterprises. As Fire Point analysts emphasize, this does not mean the entire refining volume was lost; actual losses depend on the nature of the damage and downtime duration.

### Which Russian regions were affected by the strikes?

According to the Fire Point list, the strikes covered enterprises in the Volga region, central Russia, Krasnodar Krai, and the Leningrad Oblast.

### What weapons were used?

Fire Point stated that weapons developed by the company were used for the attacks. Independent technical verification of this statement is absent in the provided materials.