---
title: "Why Electronic Warfare Can't Stop Ballistic Missiles and Guided Bombs: An Explanation from a Contra-Drone Developer"
description: "Tymofiy Yurkov, co-founder of Contra-Drone, explained why ballistic missiles and guided bombs are significantly harder to suppress with electronic warfare systems than ordinary drones: flight altitude, mass launches, and a larger explosive mass reduce the effectiveness of countermeasures."
date: 2026-08-28T08:40:03.000Z
lang: en
url: https://xab.info/en/posts/why-ew-cant-stop-ballistic-missiles-guided-bombs-contra-drone-yurkov
tags: [electronic-warfare, ballistic-missiles, kabs, contra-drone, ukraine-defense, russia-missiles, gnss, reactive-uavs]
publisher: "XAB.info"
---

# Why Electronic Warfare Can't Stop Ballistic Missiles and Guided Bombs: An Explanation from a Contra-Drone Developer

![Rocket launcher with ballistic missiles: the threat electronic warfare cannot stop — explanation by a Contra-Drone developer](https://xab.info/media/2026/08/28/rhe-b-balistika-kaby-drony-contra-drone-yurkov/rhe-b-balistika-kaby-drony-contra-drone-yurkov-1.webp)

## 🎯 Key Points

- Ballistic missiles are harder to suppress with EW due to their high flight altitude, where the signal from satellites arrives under more favorable conditions
- Russia launches 5 to 10 missiles at a single target, so even a dispersion of 20–40 m does not rule out a hit
- Guided bombs have a linear trajectory and lower altitude, which simplifies jamming, but their large explosive mass makes a deviation of 20–30 m insufficient for protection
- The range of guided bomb use (40–50 km) limits their deployment to frontline cities due to the risk from Ukrainian air defense

Ballistic and aeroballistic missiles, as well as jet-powered drones, pose a significantly harder challenge for electronic warfare (EW) systems than ordinary drones. This was explained in an interview with RBC-Ukraine by Tymofiy Yurkov, co-founder of Contra-Drone, a manufacturer of EW systems. In his words, the key difference lies in flight altitude: a ballistic missile locks onto its target at altitudes where most EW systems simply cannot reach, and the signal from navigation satellites arrives under more favorable conditions than for a low-flying UAV.

### Ballistics: GNSS Vulnerability at High Altitude

Yurkov explained that ballistic missiles initially use the GNSS system for target guidance, which theoretically makes them vulnerable to jamming. In practice, however, it is extremely difficult to engage them: the flight altitude is such that the EW signal either does not reach them or is not powerful enough to create effective interference. The expert also noted that even a deviation of the missile from its intended course by 20–40 meters could allow the target to avoid a direct hit. The problem is compounded by the tactic of mass launches: Russia often directs five to six, and sometimes around ten, missiles at a single target, so even with dispersion, one or two of them are capable of striking the object.

### Aeroballistics and Non-Ballistic Trajectories: Slightly Easier, but Still Difficult

According to Yurkov's assessment, the situation with missiles that have a non-ballistic trajectory is somewhat simpler. If a missile flies at an altitude of 2–6 km, jamming capable of deflecting it from its course can already be applied. Nevertheless, such missiles are significantly better protected against the effects of EW than ordinary UAVs, and their guidance error is usually smaller. This means that even partial jamming does not guarantee a complete disruption of the attack.

### Guided Bombs: Linear Trajectory as a Factor, but Warhead Mass as a Risk

As for guided aerial bombs (GABs), the situation for EW systems looks somewhat more favorable. They have a lower flight altitude and a more linear trajectory, which can be calculated and met in a timely manner with jamming radiation directed at the corresponding section. "In most cases, timely response and timely jamming of GABs using EW prevents a direct hit on the target," Yurkov emphasized. However, he warned: GABs carry a substantial mass of explosive, so even a deviation of 20–30 meters does not always guarantee that the object will not be damaged or destroyed by the shock wave and fragments.

### Tactics of GAB Use and the Role of Air Defense

The range of GAB use is significantly shorter than that of ballistic and aeroballistic missiles: for their release, a Russian aircraft needs to be approximately 40–50 km from the target. This creates a substantial risk for it due to the operation of Ukrainian air defense. As a result, the main targets for GABs remain frontline cities, where it is harder for Ukrainian forces to bring air defense systems close to the release zone. Thus, the effectiveness of EW against GABs largely depends on the timeliness of detection and the speed of the operators' reaction.

### Context: Escalation and Adaptation

Yurkov's expert opinion fits into a broader context of adaptation by both sides of the conflict. Earlier, RBC-Ukraine reported on how interceptor drones hunt jet-powered "Shaheds" and why this task is becoming increasingly difficult as the speed of hostile UAVs grows, as well as on whether drone-missiles like the "Banderol," which in flight profile approach cruise missiles and jet drones, can be effectively shot down. The combination of these factors — increasing speeds, changing trajectories, mass launches — makes countering a multi-vector air threat one of the key challenges for Ukrainian defense in 2026.

## 🔍 Fact-Check Verification

- [Why Ballistic Missiles and Guided Bombs Are Harder to Jam Than Drones: An Explanation from an EW Developer](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/chomu-balistiku-i-kabi-skladnishe-glushiti-1787903365.html) - Первичный источник: интервью Тимофея Юркова (Contra-Drone) для РБК-Украина. Все цитаты и цифры (20–40 м, 5–10 ракет, 2–6 км, 40–50 км) взяты из данного материала.
- ["Shaheds" Have a Harder Time Breaking Through to Kyiv: Expert Explains How to Scale This Experience](https://www.unian.net/weapons/kiev-pvo-shahedam-stalo-slozhnee-prorvatsya-v-stolicu-novosti-kieva-13335966.html) - Контекстный источник по теме ПВО и противодействия БПЛА. Не содержит противоречий с основным материалом.
- [Tymofiy Yurkov](https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/authors/68d6c49902e7a/) - Страница автора/эксперта. Подтверждает идентификацию спикера как сооснователя Contra-Drone.

## ❓ FAQ

### Q: Why are ballistic missiles harder to suppress with EW systems than ordinary drones?
**A:** According to Tymofiy Yurkov from Contra-Drone, a ballistic missile flies at a significantly higher altitude, where most EW systems cannot reach, and the signal from GNSS navigation satellites arrives under more favorable conditions than for a low-flying UAV.

### Q: How many missiles does Russia usually launch at a single target?
**A:** Yurkov notes that Russia often launches several missiles at a single target at once — sometimes five to six, and sometimes around ten. This means that even with dispersion, one or two missiles can strike the object.

### Q: How effective is EW against guided bombs?
**A:** The situation with guided bombs is somewhat better: they have a lower flight altitude and a linear trajectory that can be calculated. In most cases, timely jamming prevents a direct hit. However, due to the large mass of explosive, a deviation of 20–30 meters does not always guarantee protection from damage.

### Q: Why are guided bombs mainly dropped on frontline cities?
**A:** To release a guided bomb, a Russian aircraft needs to be 40–50 km from the target, which creates a risk from Ukrainian air defense. Therefore, the main targets remain frontline cities, where it is harder to bring air defense systems close.