The US Central Intelligence Agency has sent a warning to European countries that Russia is preparing an operation against them, which in intelligence circles is referred to as the equivalent of Ukraine's "Spiderweb." According to data obtained from European sources, potential targets of a Russian strike could be Mediterranean states — primarily Spain, France, and Italy. The key element of the planned operation is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles disguised inside standard shipping containers and launched directly from the sea.
Method: Drones in Containers and Launch from Open Water
According to information disclosed in reports delivered to European capitals, Russia may use "Gerbera"-type drones — the same unmanned aerial vehicles that are used daily to strike Ukrainian territory. The fundamental difference from the familiar tactics of "Shahed" or "Geran" attacks lies in the delivery method: a merchant ship can carry several such devices in ordinary cargo containers, making them virtually undetectable at the logistics stage. The launch is planned from the sea, at a distance of approximately 200–300 kilometers from the coast. Depending on the actual flight speed, reaching the target will take from an hour and fifteen minutes to two hours.
Limitations and Real Consequences
It is important to consider the technical limitations of the chosen weapon. Due to its small payload, the "Gerbera" drone is unlikely to be capable of destroying a major infrastructure facility. However, its use could lead to fires, equipment damage, or the temporary closure of a port or airport. This means that the potential consequences of an attack would be not only physical but also economic and political in nature: the paralysis of logistics hubs in the midst of trade cycles could cause damage many times greater than the direct material losses from the strike itself.
Political Context and the 2027 Elections
The choice of specific countries as potential targets, according to sources, is driven not only by geographic factors but also by the political context. In 2027, a number of Mediterranean states have electoral campaigns and elections scheduled. In France and Italy, as interlocutors note, there are political forces and connections that may serve Kremlin interests and exploit public fears and fatigue over support for Ukraine. "The impression the Russians want to create is their own 'Spiderweb'," a Lithuanian source explained, commenting on the logic of the planned operation. Moscow, according to intelligence data, has for a long time been building an information rationale for possible escalation: the Kremlin has repeatedly stated that transferring weapons, intelligence information, and military advisors to Ukraine turns Western states into "participants in the war" and makes them legitimate targets.
Precedents: Drones over Moldova and Romania
The concerns expressed by the CIA are not entirely hypothetical. RBC-Ukraine previously reported that unmanned aerial vehicles had flown into Moldova several times during Russian attacks on Ukrainian territory. In addition, drones have also been detected in the airspace of Romania. These incidents demonstrate that Russian unmanned aerial vehicles have already crossed the borders of countries that are not direct participants in the conflict, making the scenario of a deliberate attack on European territory not theoretical but practically feasible.
Contradictory Data
At the same time, there are certain inconsistencies in the available sources. On the one hand, the CIA and European intelligence services speak of specific preparations for an operation using "Gerbera" drones in containers. On the other hand, none of the potential target countries — Spain, France, or Italy — has officially confirmed receiving such a warning or the existence of concrete evidence of Russia purchasing corresponding batches of unmanned aerial vehicles for maritime delivery. The Lithuanian source cited in the reports frames Moscow's task as creating an "impression," which may point to an information-psychological component of the operation, rather than exclusively physical readiness to strike. Thus, the degree of real combat readiness and information pressure remains a matter of assessment, not a confirmed fact.
