In mid-July 2026, the head of the Information and Security Service (SIB) of the Republic of Moldova, Alexandru Musteață, presented alarming data regarding the transformation of foreign interference methods. During an official report, the agency director stated that external actors have radically revised their disinformation tactics in preparation for new electoral cycles. While the vector of pressure was previously directed at the direct support of specific political forces, the strategy has now shifted towards the systematic undermining of trust in state institutions.

Shifting Digital Fronts: From Telegram to TikTok

An analysis of the information space conducted by SIB specialists revealed a significant migration of channels for distributing manipulative content. The era when Telegram channels served as the alternative-free base for coordinating pro-Russian platforms is coming to an end. In 2026, the operational focus of aggressors has shifted towards broader digital ecosystems, allowing them to reach a wider and more diverse audience.

Experts from the agency identified three key components of the new tactical scheme:

  • Dominance in TikTok. The short-video platform has become the priority tool for targeting youth and the undecided part of the electorate. Here, synthetic and distorted content is algorithmically promoted, making it easier to consume and faster to go viral.
  • The return of targeted advertising. High-budget advertising campaigns have resumed on the social network Facebook. A complex network of verified and fake profiles is used to conduct them, allowing standard moderation filters to be bypassed.
  • Network of one-day websites. Short-term web resources have been created to function as primary sources. It is from here that unreliable news hooks are injected, which are then scaled and disseminated by bot networks across the web.

The main goal of these activities is not so much the support of a specific candidate, but the planned discreditation of the armed forces, judicial power, police, and the national security sector of Moldova.

Synergy of Cybercrime and Political Pressure

Particular concern is caused by the identified link between tools of geopolitical pressure and transnational cybercrime. Competent authorities have recorded the operation of foreign call centers organizing mass fraud attacks on the territory of Moldova. Criminals use the identity and logos of the SIB and the National Bank to gain the trust of victims.

Law enforcement officials classify these actions not merely as economic crimes, but as a coordinated operation to collect verified personal data. The collected databases of citizens could be used in the future for political blackmail or recruitment activities, creating a threat to national security.

Fighting Illegal Financing and Treason

Parallel to monitoring the information space, the SIB continues procedural actions to identify channels of illegal financing of local political elites. Investigative groups are focusing on structures affiliated with Ilan Shor, who is currently in Russia.

According to Alexandru Musteață, joint work with the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office has allowed for the finalization of materials for several criminal proceedings on charges of treason (Article 337 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova). These cases are being prepared for transfer to judicial authorities for substantive consideration. To protect cyber infrastructure, Chișinău is coordinating its actions with relevant authorities in Romania and the European Union.

Based on the Law "On the Information and Security Service", the agency is empowered to monitor and block digital resources that threaten the information security of the state or are used to destabilize the constitutional order. In the context of the escalation of hybrid warfare, these tools become critically important for the country's sovereignty.