In June 2025, Ukrainian intelligence services carried out an unprecedented operation on Russian territory that radically changed the perception of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. During the raid, dubbed 'Operation Web', Ukrainian saboteurs managed to deliver and conceal short-range strike drones in trucks stopped near strategic airbases. The geography of the operation covered vast territories, including the Amur region on the border with China.
Strike on Strategic Bombers
The main target of the attack was Russian airbases hosting strategic heavy bombers—carriers of nuclear weapons. Using the Russian mobile communication network, Ukrainian operators remotely launched the drones. According to Kyiv's estimates, the strike destroyed at least ten bombers and damaged another 41 aircraft. Among the damaged were also aircraft used for the command and control of the nuclear arsenal.
The economic efficiency of the operation is staggering: one drone costing about $500 destroyed a strategic bomber worth tens of millions. However, the main significance of 'Web' lies not in the cost-benefit ratio, but in the very fact of success. For years, Moscow has adhered to a doctrine stating that any conventional attack on strategic assets could provoke a nuclear response. Nevertheless, Kyiv did not shy away from attacking the enemy's nuclear capabilities, and Russia proved unable to prevent their destruction.
Crisis of Nuclear Deterrence Theory
The operation became a vivid example of a global trend: nuclear deterrence is ceasing to work as planned. For a long time, possession of nuclear weapons was considered a guarantee of security. Many observers pointed to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as proof that Kyiv made a mistake by renouncing its Soviet nuclear legacy in 1994. The logic was simple: if Ukraine had the bomb, Russia would not have dared to attack.
Similar arguments were made regarding Iran: if Tehran had its own arsenal, Israel and the US would not have been able to strike the country, eliminating leaders and military infrastructure. The conclusion was that states need to acquire weapons of mass destruction as insurance against aggression.
Reality vs. Dogma
However, modern conflicts show the opposite picture. Ukraine is striking not only deep into Russian territory but also at objects directly linked to nuclear potential. Iran and its proxies are attacking Israel, which is believed to possess nuclear weapons, targeting even nuclear facilities with missiles and drones. India and Pakistan, possessing nuclear arsenals, entered the most serious conflict in the last century in May 2025, attacking targets deep within each other's territory.
In all these cases, the threat of nuclear escalation did not prevent the conduct of conventional and hybrid warfare. State and non-state actors are, in effect, testing nuclear powers for resilience. Nuclear weapons prove powerless in the face of constant conventional attacks and cheap drones, as long as the nuclear powers themselves are not ready to use them.
The Power of the Taboo and Historical Responsibility
The strength of the 'nuclear taboo' was tested in the first months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Vladimir Putin apparently considered the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons to stop the retreat of his troops. He was held back by military advice, pressure from Beijing and New Delhi, and likely pressure from Washington.
Although the taboo is not an absolute ban, leaders considering its use face serious resistance. Moreover, they must realize that they will go down in history as the second people to use the bomb in combat, guaranteeing them an infamous place in the annals. For nuclear powers, the lesson of this moment must be shocking: opponents are increasingly willing and able to strike them with conventional weapons.