In recent years, Ukraine and Poland have experienced cycles of tension and rapprochement in bilateral relations, yet both states share a fundamental common interest — countering the Russian threat. During a working trip to Warsaw, RBC-Ukraine journalist Roman Kot conducted a series of interviews with Polish politicians, diplomats, and experts to understand what exactly is fostering the rapprochement between Kyiv and Warsaw, what continues to poison the atmosphere between the two neighboring countries, and how insurmountable the accumulated historical contradictions really are.
“Pressuring the Aggressor, Not the Victim”
The quintessence of Poland's policy regarding Ukraine is clearly visible in two key statements made in 2026. On October 12, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, commenting on US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war, stated: “We appreciate President Trump's involvement in attempts to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. But in Poland, we believe this will bear fruit if we pressure the aggressor, not the victim.” This statement came against the backdrop of escalating anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Washington and served as a clear signal that Warsaw does not intend to sacrifice its principles for the sake of diplomatic pragmatism.
Even earlier, on June 30, Polish Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz expressed a position that Kyiv perceived as direct interference in internal affairs: “In the EU, it is impossible to put on a pedestal those who destroy European cooperation. With Bandera, Ukraine will not enter the European Union.” According to him, Kyiv will face “significant problems” with European integration if OUN and UPA figures remain national symbols. Thus, Poland demonstrates a dual position: on the one hand, a pragmatic understanding of the common military threat; on the other hand, fundamental worldview differences rooted in the history of the 20th century.
Millions of People and Common Economic Interests
Despite ideological friction, Kyiv and Warsaw are connected by far too much for relations to be reduced to political statements. Economic cooperation, cultural closeness, and, above all, millions of Ukrainians who found refuge in Poland even before 2022 and especially after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, form a powerful “social cement” between the two countries. Today, it is the complex of common interests — from trade and logistics to the joint deterrence of Russian aggression — that determines the real agenda of bilateral relations. According to Polish experts, the Kremlin has long since ceased to limit its war to Ukraine alone and views Poland as an independent target for hybrid pressure.
Drones, Spies, and NATO Testing
Facts indicate that Poland has become one of the primary targets for Russian operations on the western flank. The first open incursion of Russian drones into the country's airspace occurred in September 2025, and similar incidents have occurred regularly since then. During the first eight months of 2026, Polish law enforcement agencies initiated at least 40 criminal proceedings under Article 130 of the Polish Penal Code regarding espionage and activities on behalf of foreign intelligence. The country's top leadership shares the prevailing opinion that Russia is purposefully testing the reaction of Poland and other NATO member states.
“Russia will not launch a full-scale attack on Poland today. It does not have the strength to attack in that way today. However, these types of attacks are also an attempt to test NATO's response,” an interlocutor in Poland's top leadership close to President Karol Nawrocki told RBC-Ukraine. According to him, this concerns not only the readiness of allies to scramble fighter jets or shoot down another drone, but also a deeper analysis of the entire state system's reaction: the enemy is looking for loopholes in legislation, studying the operational algorithms of Polish special services, and probing society's internal fears. The main goal of such operations is to provoke political division within the country, paralyze decision-making, and ultimately force Warsaw and Western partners to curtail their support for Ukraine.
Article 5 and Preparing for the Worst-Case Scenario
The question of how exactly to respond to Russian attacks “here and now” remains open and requires coordination within NATO. Particularly telling are Sikorski's words when he was asked whether Warsaw is confident in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and how many overflights of Russian drones or missiles over Polish territory are necessary for NATO to recognize this as direct aggression. “To both questions, the answer is essentially the same: as you know, Article 5 is not as unambiguous as some might think. And this is no accident, because it was deliberately left unsaid — exactly such wording was the limit to which the US Congress could agree in the 1950s,” the Polish Foreign Minister noted.
Considering the totality of factors, Poland, unlike many other European countries, is actively preparing for a potential war with Russia. Warsaw is intensively acquiring modern weaponry and allocating nearly 5% of its GDP to defense needs — a figure that remains one of the highest in Europe. Thus, even amid ideological friction and historical grievances, the Ukrainian-Polish alliance stays afloat due to a common challenge: the necessity to jointly deter Russian aggression, which, according to both capitals, is systemic and long-term in nature.
