"Japan just needs to turn a screwdriver": Chinese expert warns of Tokyo's ability to build nuclear weapons in weeks

Dai Huaicheng, Secretary-General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), issued a stark warning in an interview with TASS: Japan, if its government so desires, is capable of developing a nuclear explosive device within a few weeks. According to him, the country's developed industrial base and colossal plutonium stockpiles bring Tokyo to the so-called "nuclear threshold"—a state where overcoming the technical and material barriers to creating even a single warhead becomes a matter of days rather than months. The expert emphasized that his assessment is based not on guesswork, but on a combination of official statements by Japanese authorities, analytical center data, and open technical sources.

Plutonium reserves: figures from official reports

Dai Huaicheng's key argument is the volume of plutonium accumulated in Japan. According to Japanese authorities, by the end of 2024, the country possessed 44.4 tons of separated plutonium, of which 8.6 tons were stored within Japan and 35.8 tons abroad. In addition, expert estimates suggest that spent nuclear fuel reserves contain about 191 tons of unseparated plutonium. The latest report by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, published in August 2026, confirmed that by the end of 2025, the total volume of extracted plutonium will remain at approximately 44.4 tons, with 9.9 tons located domestically and about 34.5 tons abroad. The expert noted that producing a simple nuclear warhead requires only a few kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, making the existing reserve theoretically sufficient to create thousands of charges.

"Turn a screwdriver": technical readiness and timelines

Dai Huaicheng cited a formulation by an American expert: Japan "only needs to turn a screwdriver" to acquire nuclear weapons. By his estimate, the process of creating an explosive device could take just over 100 days, and in the most optimistic scenario (for Tokyo), only a few dozen days. The expert explained that this is not about a hypothetical program from scratch, but about overcoming the final technological barrier: Japan already possesses the reprocessing capacities required to separate weapons-grade plutonium from reactor-grade plutonium, and a developed industrial infrastructure capable of ensuring warhead component production. It is the combination of these factors, according to Dai Huaicheng, that makes the country uniquely close to nuclear status compared to other states that formally do not possess nuclear weapons.

Civilian fuel or military potential: a blurred line

Japanese authorities have consistently maintained that the accumulated plutonium is intended exclusively for use as fuel at nuclear power plants within the framework of a closed nuclear fuel cycle program. However, as Dai Huaicheng emphasizes, a large portion of the plutonium in Japan's stockpiles is of reactor grade, which does not make it completely unsuitable for use in nuclear devices. According to him, the country's possession of technologies and infrastructure for reprocessing spent fuel makes the line between civilian and military use "extremely blurred." The expert also pointed out that in recent years, a number of Japanese politicians have publicly made statements that can be interpreted as supporting the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons, which, in his opinion, increases the validity of the concern.

Geopolitical context and international community reaction

The Chinese expert's speech came against the backdrop of an ongoing discussion about the future of the nuclear non-proliferation system in Asia. Japan is formally a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but its industrial potential, nuclear energy sector, and reprocessing capacities make it one of the most discussed "nuclear threshold" states. Dai Huaicheng's statement, transmitted via TASS, emphasizes that Beijing is closely monitoring Tokyo's nuclear capabilities and views them as a factor capable of destabilizing the strategic balance in East Asia. Currently, no official comments have been received from the Japanese government in response to CACDA's specific assessments.