Russian information-psychological operations have long moved beyond simple fakes and propagandistic slogans. According to former Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Major General Ilya Pavlenko, their main goal today is to influence the behavior of Ukraine's citizens and the decisions of the state leadership in a way that serves the adversary's interests. In a fresh column for RBC-Ukraine, the expert details the mechanisms of this influence: from fear and personal data to artificial intelligence and the exploitation of real Ukrainian problems.
From the Soviet Experience to Hybrid Warfare
The tools of psychological operations and the units that carry them out did not appear today. They were actively used back in the Soviet era: even after the West acquired nuclear weapons, the USSR tried to solve many of its tasks precisely through information-psychological influence. In Afghanistan, according to Pavlenko, the relevant units spread rumors and jokes, distributed food and fuel to the population, tried to win its goodwill, and simultaneously sought to compromise the leaders of the opposing side. Over time, this experience became part of Russia's vision of hybrid warfare, whose logic is that before a direct attack the territory must be "prepared" — the perception of the adversary's population must be changed through information influence, since hybrid warfare is aimed first and foremost at achieving political goals, not at seizing territory.
Who and Where Conducts Cognitive Operations
Pavlenko claims that after the war began in 2014, the GRU sent representatives from the center to Rostov-on-Don, where information-psychological operations groups were created to work in occupied Ukrainian territories. According to him, at that time conversations were intercepted in which operators called the center and asked for "Yarosh business cards" to be produced, which were then presented as supposedly found "evidence." The expert emphasizes that this is not the work of the GRU alone: similar units exist in the Russian Armed Forces and are subordinate to the General Staff, and the FSB and the Foreign Intelligence Service are also involved in information operations. It is known about military units performing the functions of psychological operations centers in Rostov-on-Don, Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Khabarovsk, and Kursk. In occupied territories they work through posters and billboards, narratives about Russians as a "brotherly people," and other techniques, gradually changing the perception of reality.
Propaganda vs. Cognitive Influence
There is a significant difference between propaganda and psychological operations. Propaganda primarily tries to form certain beliefs in the population, whereas modern operations have gone further: there is increasing talk of cognitive operations, cognitive influence, and cognitive warfare. If a classic psychological operation may aim to break the population's will to resist, then the goal of a cognitive operation is to make the adversary, society, or the state leadership change its model of behavior to one that suits the aggressor. The task is no longer to make a person believe a fake, but to make the military or political leadership take a decision that benefits the adversary, even without being aware of the external influence — that is, in direct interference with the process of thinking and decision-making.
Artificial Intelligence and "Poisoning" Search Engines
Today, Russian psychological operations combine informational, cybernetic, and intelligence components, and artificial intelligence tools are being applied more and more widely. True, due to the adversary's technological limitations, a significant part of the content it generates is still low-quality and recognizable. In parallel, there are well-funded information networks and cover structures: the Russians use supposedly research organizations, create fake websites and even Wikipedia analogues to influence the information environment of other countries — for example, the election campaign in Armenia. In such a system, it is important not only to convince a specific user but also to ensure that search engines and artificial intelligence, when searching for information, encounter a mass of data in which the desired narratives have been pre-embedded.
