The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has published a detailed list of foreign-produced components used in the creation of anti-jamming Kometa navigation modules, which are installed on Russian cruise and ballistic missiles, attack drones, guided aerial bombs, and gliding munitions. This is reported by RBC-Ukraine citing the press service of the HUR MOU. According to the agency, disclosing the structure of the production chain is intended to provide an understanding of the vulnerable links through which the Russian military-industrial complex receives critical elements to ensure the resilience of onboard guidance systems against electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures.
Operating Principle of Kometa and EW Resilience
According to the disclosed information, one of the key ways to protect onboard systems from EW interference is the use of controlled reception pattern antennas. Such antennas are capable of "cutting out" interference by changing the radiation pattern and applying signal analysis algorithms. This exact method is implemented in the Kometa modules. The classical configuration of the system, used in modern Russian missiles, UAVs, and guided aerial bombs, consists of two main elements: an antenna array with a specific number of patch antennas and a signal processing module based on a programmable logic device (PLD). The system's resistance to interference is determined by the number of patch antennas, their geometric arrangement on the antenna panel, and the operating algorithm. The presence of a sufficient number of elements makes it possible to obtain spatial information about the direction of incoming interference radiation and compensate for its impact.
Production Chain: From Serbian Group to Chinese Suppliers
According to HUR, the developer and main enterprise for the production of Kometa modules of various modifications is the Russian enterprise VNIIIR-Progress, which is part of the ABS Electro group of companies controlled by the sanctioned pro-Russian Serbian politician Nenad Popović. The procurement of components for module production is carried out by another enterprise of the same group. Among the suppliers named are Chinese microelectronics distributors and sellers, as well as Russian intermediaries. To fulfill orders from Russian defense industry companies, VNIIIR-Progress uses its own production facilities as well as the capacities of other group companies. The main customers for Kometa modules are manufacturers of Russian cruise and ballistic missiles, strike UAVs, guided aerial bombs, and gliding munitions.
Scale of Application and Current Modifications
As of the time of publication, Kometas with 16 patch antennas are already being massively deployed by the enemy. At the same time, as HUR reports, work is underway to organize serial production of 20-element antenna arrays, which will further enhance the jam-resistance of onboard guidance systems. This indicates a continuous cycle of improving navigation modules in response to the development of EW tools used by the Ukrainian side.
Context: Sanctions Pressure and Circumvention Schemes
The disclosure of the supply structure emphasizes that despite multi-level sanctions pressure, the Russian military-industrial complex maintains access to critical microelectronics components through chains of intermediaries and foreign distributors. The involvement of the Serbian group ABS Electro and Chinese suppliers demonstrates a typical restriction-circumvention scheme in which final production is formally located in Russia, while key elements are imported through jurisdictions not participating in sanctions regimes. Earlier, RBC-Ukraine reported that Japan plans to consider transferring missiles for Patriot systems to Ukraine: according to former Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, legal restrictions exist in the country, but the government intends to start internal discussions on this issue.
