"The Forecast Should Not Be Seen as a Sentence": NAS of Ukraine Demographer Explains How to Slow Population Decline

Ukraine's demographic landscape has undergone fundamental changes during the years of full-scale war, rendering previous forecasting models obsolete. This was stated by Oleksandr Gladun, Chief Researcher at the Department of Demographic Modeling and Forecasting of the Institute of Demography and Quality of Life Problems of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Ukraine, in an interview with UNIAN, as reported by RBC-Ukraine. According to him, relying on data from five, seven, or ten years ago is no longer sufficient: the war has become a factor that must be factored into every calculation scenario. "Forecasts are reviewed either annually or with a certain periodicity depending on variable factors. Therefore, the forecast should not be seen as a sentence," the demographer emphasized.

Three Pillars of Demographic Forecasting and the Problem of Uncertainty

Gladun explained that any demographic forecasts are built on three basic factors: fertility, mortality, and migration. Specialists analyze trends from previous years and form several possible scenarios based on them — from optimistic (rising birth rates alongside falling mortality) to pessimistic (opposing trends). The longer the forecasting horizon, the higher the degree of uncertainty, as the demographic situation is influenced by numerous variables that cannot be foreseen in advance. That is why, according to the expert, it is critically important for Ukraine to consider various scenarios for the end of hostilities: if the war ends in 2026, an optimistic demographic scenario is plausible; in 2027–2028, an intermediate one; and in the event of a protracted conflict until 2030, a pessimistic one.

Global Trend and Ukrainian Specifics

Gladun noted that under current conditions, forecasts for almost all countries in the world point to a population decline: "In the middle of this century, the planet's population will begin to decline — this is a global trend, so to speak. We just have our own specifics." At the same time, he cautioned against hasty conclusions about Ukraine's "demographic doom." Even if the downward trend continues, the pace of this process can realistically be slowed down. However, stopping hostilities alone is not enough for this: the state must implement an active socio-demographic and economic policy, creating more favorable living conditions. In 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the Demographic Development Strategy until 2030, but as the expert emphasizes, its effectiveness directly depends on the level of funding.

Figures to Close: From 90 to 210 Children per 100 Women

A key indicator pointed out by Gladun is the total fertility rate, expressed as the number of children born per 100 women. To avoid the threat of population decline, approximately 210–220 children must be born per 100 women. Current estimates, according to the demographer, are only about 90–110 children per 100 women. The gap between the required and actual figures remains colossal. At the same time, pre-invasion studies demonstrated that Ukrainian families generally aimed to have two children: the desire to have children exists, but people need proper conditions — ranging from housing and healthcare to stable incomes and security.

The Economy Must Adapt to Demographics, Not Vice Versa

Gladun urged a revision of the very approach to demographic challenges: "We must somehow stop obsessing over population size. The economy must adapt to what is there." Even with a shrinking population, labor productivity can increase through automation, the introduction of artificial intelligence, and better workflow organization. At the same time, the expert emphasizes that all three demographic factors — fertility, life expectancy, and migration — are closely interconnected, and it is difficult to single out one decisive factor. Each of them can be influenced, including migration: people leave abroad not only because of wage differentials, but also due to a complex of socio-domestic and psychological reasons. Demographic processes in the first few years after the end of the war and three to five years later may differ significantly, and separate assumptions and targeted programs are needed for each of these periods.