US House on the Verge of Passing the Graham–Blumenthal 'Hellish Sanctions': What Will Change for the Kremlin

On September 16, the US House of Representatives is set to finally adopt the Graham–Blumenthal bill, the final version of which has been named the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The document, which has undergone multiple revisions and name changes, effectively marks the evolution of Washington's sanctions policy: from a one-off political signal to systematic economic pressure on the Russian Federation. The key caveat, however, is that adoption of the text in Congress does not automatically trigger the sanctions — the final decision on their application remains with US President Donald Trump.

From Political Signal to Systematic Pressure

The final version of the document combines two tracks of restrictions — personal and sectoral. The personal measures target the top political and military leadership of the Russian Federation, as well as individuals involved in sanctions evasion, human rights violations, money laundering, and destabilization of the situation in Ukraine. Shareholders of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects, vessels of the so-called "shadow fleet," and associated persons may also fall under the restrictions. The toolkit here is traditional and proven: asset freezes and visa restrictions.

Personal and Sectoral Restrictions

Sectoral sanctions strike at the key sources of funding for the Russian economy — the energy and financial sectors. The list of targeted institutions includes the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, and other state financial institutions. The bill strictly prohibits any US investment in the Russian energy sector. As Vladyslav Vlasyuk, the President of Ukraine's envoy for sanctions policy, previously noted, in August of last year there was discussion of a possible return of the American company Exxon Mobil to the "Sakhalin-1" project, and such a prohibition makes this scenario impossible.

Blow to Energy and the "Shadow Fleet"

The restrictions cover both the export of American energy resources to Russia and the import of Russian uranium. Sanctions are separately expanded with respect to the "Yamal LNG" and "Arctic LNG" projects, including their executives and key shareholders. A separate section of the document is devoted to dismantling the evasion mechanisms that Moscow has adapted for survival: the "shadow fleet," financial intermediaries, cryptocurrencies, and third-country jurisdictions. According to the authors' logic, without closing off these channels, even the toughest restrictions will eventually lose their effectiveness over time.

Secondary Sanctions Against Trading Partners

The most tangible instrument of pressure may be the secondary measures against Russia's trading partners. They provide for additional tariffs against countries that continue to import energy from the Russian Federation or facilitate sanctions evasion. In the previous draft, the maximum rate for such cases reached 500%; during refinement it was reduced to 100% with certain exceptions, although the overall logic has been preserved: to make cooperation with Russia economically unprofitable for third countries.

Contradictory Data

During the refinement of the document, key figures changed: the maximum rate of secondary tariffs was reduced from 500% in the early draft to 100% in the final version, reflecting a compromise between stringency and the political passability of the text. A significant inconsistency also exists in the interpretation of the law's strength: on the one hand, the initiative is presented as a "hellish blow" against the Russian Federation and its allies, while on the other — the text is not categorical regarding the mandatory application of the measures and merely provides the president with an expanded set of tools. Thus, even after adoption in Congress, the actual pressure depends on the willful decision of the White House, rather than on automatic entry into force.

The President's Role and the Revocation-Blocking Mechanism

The most important political innovation of the document is the mechanism for blocking the revocation of sanctions: the restrictions cannot be lifted until Russia ceases hostilities and signs a peace agreement "acceptable to the free and independent Government of Ukraine." Particular attention is given to Moscow's main partners — Iran and China. Although the bipartisan "Stop China and Russia Act" initiative formally remains a separate bill, its key concept is reflected in the Graham–Blumenthal text: the sanctions officially extend to Iran's energy sector, prolonging the effect of the basic restrictions until 2031.

Timeline of the Initiative

The bill was first registered in the US Senate in April 2025 by senators from two competing parties — Lindsey Graham of the Republicans and Richard Blumenthal of the Democrats. By July of the same year, the initiative already enjoyed strong support: 85 of 100 senators declared their readiness to back it. Nevertheless, Lindsey Graham did not rush to advance the text, and only now, more than a year later, is the document reaching its final stage in the House of Representatives. The outcome of the vote and the president's subsequent actions will determine whether the bill becomes an effective instrument of pressure or remains a declarative but politically significant signal.