Ukraine has effectively turned a civilian technology into a mass-produced class of guided weapons and built a new defense industry around it. This was stated in a comment to RBC-Ukraine by Igor Fedirko, CEO of the Ukrainian Council of Arms Manufacturers. According to him, today more than 160 companies in the country produce FPV drones, with a combined production capacity exceeding 8 million units per year. In 2025, the Defense Forces received 3 million FPV drones. In the first half of 2026, the state contracted for drones of various types worth 333.6 billion hryvnia, with FPV drones being the largest category. As the expert emphasizes, this is no longer about experimental development but about industrial-scale production.

From Experimental Development to Industrial Scale

The key shift, according to Fedirko, is the transition from individual workshops to a systematic industry. A combined capacity of 8 million drones per year, against actual deliveries of 3 million in 2025, indicates a significant production reserve and that military demand has not been met. Contracts worth 333.6 billion hryvnia in the first half of 2026, with FPV drones occupying the leading category, confirm that unmanned aerial vehicles have ceased to be a niche tool and have become one of the main items of defense procurement. This means sustained demand, standardization of components, and the emergence of specialized suppliers at every level of the supply chain — from motors and frames to electronics and munitions.

How Drones Rewrote the Tactics of War

Over the past few years, FPV drones have changed both the geography and the speed of combat operations. They gave tactical units their own means of precision strike with video control, which previously had been available only at the level of artillery and aviation. In a traditional system, the interval between target detection and an artillery strike could range from 20 minutes to several hours. The integration of reconnaissance, FPV drones, and digital systems has shortened this cycle to a matter of minutes. The mass deployment of these vehicles has created zones of persistent strike, complicated the movement of armored vehicles, the delivery of ammunition, rotation, and evacuation. According to data cited by Fedirko, in 2025 around 60% of enemy losses were linked to the use of FPV drones.

The Race of Adaptation and Electronic Warfare

The expert emphasizes that FPV is a technology of constant adaptation. As of April 2026, more than 92% of the entire previous year's volume had already been delivered, indicating that the high pace of supply is being maintained. At the same time, new solutions are being tested at ranges of up to 25 kilometers under the influence of various types of electronic warfare. This means that the race between drone operators and electronic countermeasures continues, and that range and link reliability are becoming key parameters of a vehicle's competitiveness.

New Frontiers: Interceptors and a Gliding Bomb

In parallel with the mass production of FPV drones, more complex classes are also developing. It was previously reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces received their first jet-powered interceptor drone, designed to counter "Shaheds." In addition, according to media reports, Ukraine has completed the development of its first gliding aerial bomb, the KAB "Vyравnyvatelevi," after a year and a half of work. These projects point to an expansion of the technological front: from tactical FPV drones to interceptors and guided aerial bombs, strengthening the overall defense potential.

Contradictory Data

Differences between sources concern framing above all, rather than the figures. The Ukrainian side, represented by RBC-Ukraine and an expert from the Ukrainian Council of Arms Manufacturers, classifies FPV drones as an element of a new defense industry and a tool of defense. The Russian outlet vz.ru, by contrast, in a headline dated July 14, 2026, characterizes Ukraine's mass use of FPV drones as the "main weapon of terror." Specific production and contract figures (160+ companies, 8 million per year, 333.6 billion hryvnia in the first half of 2026) are cited in a single source — the expert's statement — and, as of publication, have not been confirmed by independent audit, so they should be regarded as expert estimates rather than verified statistical data.