The number of Russian missiles used since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, according to Defense Express arms expert and serviceman of the 413th Unmanned Systems Forces Regiment 'Raid' Ivan Kyrychevskyi, has long exceeded the mark of 12,000 units of all types. At the same time, the growth in the number of launches has stopped at a plateau, and according to the speaker, there are several systemic reasons for this. He spoke about this in the RBC-Ukraine podcast 'TSE BAZA', released in October 2026.
Ukrainian air defense based on S-300: 'defying the laws of physics'
The first and, according to Kyrychevskyi, key reason for the stagnation of missile launches is the success of the Ukrainian air defense system, built primarily on Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems. Ukraine, he said, has become the first country in the world to learn how to shoot down air targets on an industrial scale using Soviet-era SAM systems: the S-125 was adapted to intercept cruise missiles, and the S-300 to engage subsonic targets. The expert recalled that before February 2022, S-300 systems were used in very few conflicts and nowhere demonstrated the ability to effectively hit cruise missiles. As examples, he cited the raid on the facilities of the Assad regime in Syria in 2017 and the Karabakh war in 2020, where, according to him, not a single cruise missile was shot down. Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunners, in Kyrychevskyi's assessment, effectively 'defied the laws of physics' by teaching the S-300 to intercept subsonic cruise missiles in large quantities.
Psychological effect instead of accuracy
The second reason, the expert said, is the conclusions that the Russian command drew back in 2023 based on its own failures. According to him, in the plans of the Russian Ministry of Defense, all missiles were supposed to hit targets with 100% accuracy, and the department's reports recorded just that, but reality was different. As a result, Russia relied on the psychological effect of strikes: when out of ten launched missiles nine are shot down, it goes unnoticed, but a single hit is discussed on all channels, analyzing business losses and civilian casualties. Kyrychevskyi called this approach 'a cunning, malicious calculation that has certain grounds', emphasizing that it works precisely due to the massive use of air defense, which hides the scale of losses of the attacking side.
Navy and strategic aviation: uncompensated losses
Separately, the expert dwelled on the state of the Russian Navy and strategic aviation. Thanks to marine drones and cruise missiles, including drone-missiles, the freedom of action of the Black Sea Fleet, in his assessment, has been paralyzed. Russia had to move part of its forces to the Caspian Sea, which Kyrychevskyi called a 'local naval catastrophe': the fleet concentrated in the Caspian, he said, has zero combat power in a strategic sense. As for strategic aviation, by the beginning of the full-scale invasion, according to the expert, Russia had about 60 Tu-95MS bombers. As of October 2026, 46 machines remain on paper, and 38 are capable of flight, and this does not mean that all of them are ready for takeoff simultaneously.
2026 — the year of strikes on Russia's missile industry
Kyrychevskyi emphasized that 2026 has become a year of active and massive strikes on the Russian missile industry for Ukraine. He spoke about the Russian project of a mass cruise missile for strategic aviation — 'Izdelie 30' — as well as the idea of a local upgrade of the Su-34: attaching a pylon for suspending the Kh-101, similar to the one installed on the Tu-95MS, to compensate for losses after Operation 'Spiderweb'. The first strike on the 'Kremny El' plant, where, according to the expert, work on 'Izdelie 30' was underway, was carried out in March 2026 with corrections by Bryansk operators of his regiment. The Defense Forces delivered a secondary strike in the autumn, obviously to keep the plant in ruins. As a result, according to Kyrychevskyi, 'Izdelie 30' was never implemented in mass production.
'Gerans' instead of Kh-101 and preparation for conflict with NATO
Due to the impossibility of massively using cruise missiles, Russia was forced to scale up the production of jet drones. Kyrychevskyi drew a comparison: the warhead of the 'Geran-5' is 90 kg, a standard Kh-101 is 500 kg, and a missile with a dual warhead is 800 kg. In his assessment, one modernized Kh-101 would cause damage comparable to ten 'Geran-5s', but the resource of bombers is not limitless, so they had to bet on ten drones instead of one missile. The expert also suggested that Russia, given an appropriate political decision, expects to fight NATO 'the old-fashioned way' — with tank columns, massive use of aviation, and rapid seizure of air supremacy. Against the background of falling resources, in his opinion, Moscow may preserve it for a potential conflict with the alliance. In addition, Kyrychevskyi put forward a hypothesis that Russia acquired or stole technologies of the Ukrainian 'Banderol' drone, which, together with the 'Dan-T', should be considered small-sized cruise missiles with a takeoff weight of 260 kg, of which 130 kg accounts for the warhead.
